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ABSTRACT
Arab Spring is commonly associated to youth mobilization and their
dissatisfaction with respective Arab authoritarian regimes. This empirical study explores
such claim through tracing various social, political and demographic indicators as
determinants of generational value change in post-2011 Egypt. It employs a generational
perspective in discovering such values following Karl Mannheim‟s definition of
generations. Mannheim argued that a political generation is composed of a birth cohort
sharing similar values through a multifaceted historical process of socialization. The
theoretical framework guiding considerable portion of this study is Ronald Inglehart‟s
“intergenerational value change thesis.” Inglehart argues that there is an ongoing
transnational value shift towards “postmaterialism,” which includes self-expression,
quality of life and sense of belonging values with less emphasis on “materialist” values of
traditionalism and security concerns. For Inglehart, younger generations are more likely
to be postmaterialists given that their formative experiences are shaped through
socioeconomic prosperity if compared to older cohorts.
In this study, I aim to address central inquiry on whether youth values are
different from their older peers and its relevance to the 2011 events in Egypt. In doing
so, this reaserach below, starts by inspecting the relevance of postmaterialism argument
to Egyptian youth within international and regional contexts. Secondly, it maps out
generational trends in relevance to political values. And finally investigate social
parameters‟ effects aiming at scrutinizing changing youth values in post-2011 Egypt.
Most of studies on youth in Egypt and the Middle East are yet historical or anecdotal. In
this project below, we examine secondary data from the World Values Survey and the
2

Arab Barometer collected between 2001 and 2013. In order to untangle the unique effects
of our proposed forecasters, we run multiple regressions instead of conventional bivariate
associations and percentage distributions.
On the whole, we find very limited support for Inglehart‟s thesis in explaining the
Egyptian

case.

Although

younger

generation

shows

more

propensities

for

postmaterialism, nevertheless the relative salience of such values is low in Egypt. We call
for reconsidering Inglehart‟s model in developing nations. Moreover, we find evidence
for cohort value variance in regard to some political and social values. However, part of
these differences is related to intra-cohort aging effects. Thus, we cast doubt for the youth
uniqueness claim and call for its refinement. Furthermore, we cast additional doubt for
the claim on the liberal nature of young Egyptians. In addition, we find considerable
support for youth fragmentation in Egypt. Much of the division among them is explained
by demographic factors. Overall, this study opens the door for future qualitative studies
through investigating our proposed criticisms and doubts on the existing claims on the
youth distinctiveness in Egypt who agitated the 2011 uprising.
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CHAPTER I
The RISE OF A NEW GENERATION
1.1 Background
Political activism is regarded as a distinctive feature characterizing current young
people in the world. This phenomenon has attracted scholars from diverse academic
backgrounds to study and elucidate; particularly after the Arab spring uprisings in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Although there is plethora of studies on the
social, economic and political milieu in which this new international generation has
pushed through, less attention was assigned to understanding their value systems
reflected in their means of expression and forms of engagement. This study aims to
explore youth values in comparison to older cohorts testing the claim of their relative
uniqueness.
Youth values -expressed in multiple forms of sociopolitical engagement- cannot
be exclusively restricted in MENA-related activism. In late 2014, the young in Hong
Kong led wide protests against Beijing‟s interference in the constituency‟s 2017 chief
executive elections regulations.1 This new generation that did not eyewitness the pre1997 British ruling settings organized through “Occupy Central” movement expressing
their low level of trust in the Chinese government policies; according to a recent poll by
Hong Kong‟s University public opinion program.2 In a similar vein and away from the
east and the underdeveloped world, “Occupy” movements have swept major western

1

“Hong Kong protests: The key players,‟‟ BBC World News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china29408476, Retrieved October 20, 2014.
2

“Press Release,” Public Opinion Programme, Hong Kong University, September 23, 2014.
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1186.html, Retrieved October 20, 2014.
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capitals such as London, New York, and Paris. Described by its members as anticonsumerist movements, these utterances of outcry pinpoint to a different category of
modern young people who hold new set of values in terms of involvement and social
responsibility. In New York, participants in “Occupy” movement expressed their
dissatisfaction with the unequal income distribution and the growing role of capitalism in
decision-making process at the federal level in the United States of America.3 As such,
youth movements‟ experiences in the past decade such as “Otpor” in Serbia, “Pora” in
Ukraine, “Kmara” in Georgia, and “Mjaft” in Albania managed to topple diverse
authoritarian administrations; and in consequence inspired other MENA-youth
movements like “6th of April” in Egypt to shadow their path.
Youth expression of dissatisfaction and desire for change are central melodies in
MENA; this region which has been always allegedly resistant to democratization.4 For
example in Iran, the 2009 so-called “Green Revolution” initiated by the new generation.
Iranian youth expressed their skepticism of election results after naming the conservative
candidate “Ahmedi Nejad” as president.5 Although such movement brutally repressed at
its time, it forced the conventional-religious establishment to accept moderate candidate

3

Sean Captain, “Infographic: Who Is Occupy Wall Street,” FastCompany.Com, November 2, 2011.
http://web.archive.org/web/20120719184547/http://www.fastcompany.com:80/1792056/occupy-wallstreet-demographics-infographic, Retrived October 21, 2014.
4

Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004, pp. 139-141.
5

Tara Nesvaderani, “Iran‟s Youth: The Protests Are Not Over,” United Sates Institute of Peace, Peace
Brief 36, June 8, 2010, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pb36_0.pdf, Retrived October 21,
2014.

02

“Hassan Rohani” as the new president of Iran in 2013.6 Similarly, Middle East
democracy scholars argue that Turkey is likely to remain unstable after the June 2013
youth protests given the unwarranted tough response from the Justice and Development
Party (AKP)-Islamist ruling government. As consequence, recent 2015 parliamentary
elections showed a similar trend like Iran leading to a lower turnout support for the ruling
conservative party.7
In a related vein, one can argue that political developments in Iran and Turkey are
related to the historic 2011 youth led-mobilization in the Arab world. This led to the rise
of question related to the distinctiveness of current Arab youth in relation to older cohorts
who participated in earlier waves of anti-colonial activism subsequent to the World War
II. Part of the answer related to the role of Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs) in helping the youth generation spreading their discontent through
being active on the cyber space. This thesis does not dismiss such claim, although it aims
at studying such elucidations in interplay with the changing youth values per se within a
broad international generational replacement trend. Values of the “New Arabs” according
to Juan Cole are historically different as they reflect a divergent level of socioeconomic
progression in terms of excessive urbanization, cosmopolitanism and economic
disparities, and a bulge including 60% of population across Arab states.8

6

Bijan Khajehpour, “Iran‟s Youth Key to Elections,” Almonitor, May 31, 2013, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/iran-elections-youth-vote.html#, Retrived October 21, 2014.
7

Joanna Slater, “Historic ousting of Erdogan‟s majority spells new uncertainty for Turkey”, The Globe and Mail,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/historic-ousting-of-erdogans-majority-spells-newuncertainty-for-turkey/article24846329/, Retrived June 15, 2015.
8

Juan Cole, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is changing the Middle East, New York,
Simon and Schuster, 2014, pp. 2-15.
03

Events of “Arab Spring” are the highlight of youth activism in MENA. I believe it
is likely to be –however not exclusively- related to young Arabs value system.
Nevertheless, it is considerably hard task to capture youth values in the region that led to
such unprecedented mobilization. In the efforts to approach such puzzle we empirically
map youth values based on their socioeconomic context while using Ronald Inglehart‟s
intergenerational value change thesis as a guiding framework for comparison with other
International young values‟ trends.9
This study focuses on generational value differences in its focal case study
“Egypt.” Egyptian youth are considered by many scholars to be the chief driving agent
behind the 2011 uprising. Due to high level of unemployment and social inequality
among young Egyptians, I believe this generation was frustrated by the political
censorship exercised by Mubarak‟s regime. Additionally, claims have been raised on this
generation‟s value system to be more liberal, less religious and more democratic, thus the
2011 uprising was considered to be natural breakthrough of the domination of these
appearances.10 Most importantly, in terms of demographic power, Egypt is witnessing a
historic youth bulge; in which 62% of Egyptians are below the age of 29 reported in
2012.11 This bulge is expected to last at least for the next three decades, if the current
composition of population growth continues in a similar fashion. Based on the earlier

9

Ronald Inglehart and others argued extensively since the late 1970s that there is an international
generational value change towards postmaterialist values. Based on refined version of modernization
theory, he operationalized postmaterialism as progression towards self-expression and secular attitudes
rather than religious and survival self-reported values.
10

Ellen Knickmeyer, “The Arab World‟s Youth Army,” Foreign Policy, 27 January 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/27/the-arab-worlds-youth-army-2/, Retrived June 01, 2015.
11

Egypt: Population Overview, United Nations Population Fund,
http://egypt.unfpa.org/english/Staticpage/1/89ee0417-6c84-4410-8317f41518c07273/Population_and_Development.aspx, Retrived May 18, 2015.
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mentioned facts, we believe that successive waves of youth activism in Egypt are
expected to intensify, while treating the bulge effect as an amplifying factor for
generational value change.
To sum up this introductory part, such recent international waves of youth
activism in the developed as well as the MENA region indicate the salience of youth
phenomenon in way that was not addressed before. Moreover, it suggests that the current
Egyptian youth generation holds different values from older cohorts in terms of activism,
forms of expression, and channels of political participation. In understanding such claims,
we aim to give considerable attention to the socioeconomic context allowing youth values
to appear in Egypt. In addition to mapping out youth value system characteristics based
on their attitudes towards democracy, religion and gender tolerance.
1.2 Literature Review
At the theoretical level, there is overabundance of studies that gave special
attention to youth, generational value replacements and characteristics of youth values in
MENA. This part reviews related literature to intergenerational value change
mechanisms, youth as an analytical category in the Middle East and its related
characteristics. It aims at mapping out existing gaps when it comes to the study of the
youth phenomenon in the Middle East, and the case of Egypt in particular.
Dynamics of Generational Value Change
Generational value change conceptualization is divided between two major
schools of thought, one focuses on the life-cycle changing values, and the other bases its
argumentation on the salience of formative experiences during early adulthood and its

05

enduring effects on youth values. Institutional and Life-Cycle school of thought bases
its argument on stages of cognitive and biological progression through one‟s life cycle.
This school influenced much of the research on equal-sized age cohorts in studying
partisan identification in the United States and Europe treating those effects as systematic
ones.12 Other scholars looked on the interplay between aging processes and socialization.
As the person ages, his attitudes become more rigid and conservative, due to the loss of
social status, i.e. the lesser ability for interaction with others due to pure biological
reasons such as cognitive disabilities. Similar evidence is found in the “disengagement
theory.” It suggests that when individuals grow old, they tend to be more restricted in
terms of group membership and interaction with others, either voluntarily or due to
societal conducts.
Another possible explanation for the effect of age is by controlling for the
variable of experience. As young people usually do not have enough experience coining
their attitudes to be more optimistic. Other institutional theories focus on “the relearning
alignment process,” where individuals change their opinions and attitudes through their
life cycles disregarding the prominence of childhood and early adulthood socialization.13
However, empirical research does not fully support the continuity of early formed
attitudes over successive life stages as cultural theorists suggest. 14

12

Michael X. Delli Carpini, Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research,
Robert S. Sigel (editor), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 16-20.
13

Joseph R. Demartini, "Change Agents and Generational Relationships: A Re-evaluation of Mannheim's
Problem of Generations," Special Forces, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 4-12.
14

M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations," The Public Opinion
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1996, pp. 228-252.
06

In another vein, other set of studies underlines Cultural and Political
Socialization explanations in shaping attitudes and their change. Talcott Parsons and
Edward Shils argued that any given political system holds embedded group of sentiments
and manifestations within; reflected on its public through their value system and roles in
the polity afterwards.15 Similarly, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their study of
civic culture mapped the operational components of society's political culture to include
cognitive, affective and evaluational attitudes towards their role and the general political
system per se, thus shaping individuals‟ attitudes and consequently their forms of
political engagement.16 In the same line, James Scott studied the relationship between
political culture and individual's political behavior and program of action. 17 Scott argued
that it can be best explained through mechanisms of political socialization.
Cultural theories stress on the process of political learning through which
generations undergo subsequent phases of political socialization. David Easton and
Robert Hess suggested that the process of political socialization starts in the early stages
of childhood at the age of three through family, and the schooling system. However, such
forms of socialization do not yield symmetric effects on the same birth cohort.18
Moreover, David Sears and others noted the importance of education in attitude
formation that shapes the persistence of the ideological way of thinking with little change
15

Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1951, pp. 59-60.
16

Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, p.15.
17

James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite, Connecticut, Yale
University Press, 1968, pp. 35-48.
18

David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "A Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 6, August 1962, p. 236.
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over time.19 Fred Greenstein noted that attitudes are formulated at a very young age, but
its ramifications and effects are shaped through adulthood-learning phase, as it works as
"filters" for any subsequent kind of knowledge a person may acquire.20
The study of generations was developed mainly through Karl Mannheim‟s classic
writings. Mannheim argued that political generations came to existence through a
complex historical-social process of socialization.21 The impressionable years‟ hypothesis
was ultimately coined with the efforts of Theodore Newcomb and Norman Ryder based
on Mannheim‟s earlier explanation.22 Both scholars argued that individuals of the same
birth cohorts aging tentatively between eighteen and twenty-five in their formative years
are most likely to share the same political attitudes if witnessed a salient political event.
Thus, this particular age cohort represents a distinctive political generation, and probably
differs from other generations. Later on, Howard Schuman and others argued that
attitudes fluctuate during youth time, then enters stability stage afterwards, thus they do
not completely support the earlier proposition on attitudinal stability among birth
cohorts.23 On the contrary, Paul DiMaggio and Ronald Inglehart stress the weight on

19

David O. Sears, "Life-Stage Effects on Attitude Change, especially among the Elderly," in Sara B.
Kiesler, James N. Morgan, and Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer (editors), Aging: Social Change, New York,
Academic Press, 1981, pp. 185-200.
20

Freed Greenstein, "The Political Socialization," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Science,
New York, Macmillan, 1968, Vol. 14, pp. 551-555.
21

Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti (editor), Essays on the sociology of
Knowledge, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 281-310.
22

Norman Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological
Review, 30, 1965, pp. 849-852.
23

Howard Schuman and Amy D. Corning, "Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The Soviet Era from
the Great Purge to Glasnost," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 4, January 2000, pp. 933-946.
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attitudes and memories on salient political events in early adulthood that is likely to
persist after fluctuations to form certain characteristics of a given political generation.24
On the other hand, Nicholas Danigelis and others found that not all political
events qualify to be salient to add to the coining of political attitudes among certain age
cohorts.25 In the same line, Kent Jennings tackled the salience nature of political events,
relating it to its "visibility" for a certain birth cohort in their formative years.26 Therefore,
Inglehart and others highlighted the need for careful cross-sectional intergenerational
analysis as inter-cohort differences is more present in advanced societies than developing
ones, due to the unstable political circumstances they pass through leaving no space for
salient political events, as many can be considered as such.27
Inglehart‟s efforts in producing the Euro barometer and the World Values Survey
(WVS) later on are considered major contribution to the study of generations based on
the gradual accumulative socioeconomic progression thesis. This line of thought rejects
Mannheim‟s stance on the effect of salient events in shaping long-lasting political
attitudes.28 Inglehart through his scholarship on value change in Western developed
states, noted that there is a silent revolution tacking place allowing for a generational
value change causing the emergence of postmaterialist values of self-expression and
24

Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, pp. 270-280.

25

Nicholas L. Danigelis, Melissa Hardy and Stephen J. Cutler, "Population Aging, Intracohort Aging, and
Sociopolitical Attitudes," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 5, October, 2007, pp. 812-825.
26

M. Kent Jennings, "Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest Generation," The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, June, 1987, pp. 367-372.
27

Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker , "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of
Traditional Values, "American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 30-34.
28

Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 82,
1988, No. 4, pp.103-110.
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secularism among younger birth cohorts born after the World War II.29 Moreover,
Inglehart rejected the role of aging or life-cycle effects. Simultaneously, he noted the
theoretical difficulty in distinguishing between cohort, period, and life-cycle effects even
statistically-wise.30 Accordingly, for elaborating the cohort effects, it needs a suitable
theoretical background to control or rule out the other effects for suitable understanding.
Youth Characteristics in the Middle East
Youth bulge in the Middle East is growing intensively, with sixty percent of the
population below the age of thirty, and more than half of the people fall below the age of
twenty-five; that is twice the corresponding age category in North America.31. The
segments below cover youth features and its usage as an analytical concept in the Middle
East.
In his book, Tarik Yousef and Navtej Dhillon focused on the social grievances
that unite the youth in MENA, arguing that such category is socially marginalized, thus
contributing to their coherent collective action which affects the policy-making
processes.

32

The same line of thought is present internationally; Johanna Wyn stressed

the policy-implications that affect the youth as social category, accompanied by the shift

29

Ronald Inglehart, Culture Ship in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1990.
30

Ronald Inglehart, "Postmaterialism in an Environment of Insecurity,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 75, 1981, pp. 883 -884.
31

Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal, “The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and
Similarities,” Middle East Law and Governance, Vol.4, 2012, pp. 169-170.
32

Tarik Yousef and Navtej Dhillon, "Introduction," Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Young People in the Middle East, Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef (editors), Washington, DC, The
Brookings Institution, 2009, pp. 1-10.

21

towards capitalist forms of policies in the western societies since the 1980s.33 Wyn
looked at the youth through their reactions to such policy implications in the fields of
education, health, and labor. Since the 1970s, the study of political generations in MENA
highlighted the youth as active agents bringing up change in ways never expected
before.34 This post-independence generation who are more educated, and urbanized are
willing to determine the fate of their societies. Thus, the young are the main pillar for
post-colonial political settings in MENA. Projecting such conception on the modern
developments, Bahgat Korany noted the importance of youth activism as unique
phenomenon adopting a social movement‟s theory (SMT) which encompasses
mobilization, political opportunity structure (POS), and framing.35 Similarity, Dina
Shehata acknowledged the youth mobilization in the Egyptian 2011 uprising, arguing that
their organization is integral to understand the dynamics of such events, as a part of a
general Egyptian social movement.36
On the other hand, other scholars overlooked the youth as an analytical category
in relation to the Arab Spring events and in part as primary source of change. John
Chalcraft extended his disagreement to oppose the "exclusive" linkage between Arab
Uprisings and youth, while undermining the role of new forms of social media such as
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"Facebook" in mobilizing these mass uprisings.37 In the same line, Kastrinou
Theodoropoulou argued that using youth as analytical unit is of no theoretical
significance as it renders different types of resistance and struggle into a nominal holistic
building unit.38 Asef Bayat‟s work on Islamists Movements in MENA suggested an
alternative view. Bayat employed Bourdieu‟s position on the manipulative nature of the
concept of youth; as it does not represent a single category. Thus, it needs a deep
examination. Consequently, Bayat proposed a youth-sensitive approach rather than
treating the youth as a distinct analytical category.39
Nevertheless this intense debate on youth in MENA, the generational replacement
perspective is overlooked.40 It was only mentioned back in 2009 through Fahmy
Hewidy‟s induction on the Egyptian youth reactions towards political conflict with
Algeria over a sports event.41 Likewise, Emma Murphy in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring adopted the conception of generations through the study of youth and their value
system to explain their activism. 42 According to Murphy, young generation in the region
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are different from their older peers, in terms of expressing their opinions, tools used, and
their rejection of the “failed” Arab states in which they live in.
In the same line, other scholars argued that current MENA youth activism waves
are reaction to deliberalizing respective political public spheres.43 Youth being left out of
formal political channels, found in cyber space a parallel platform to express their
opinions and voice out their dissatisfaction spontaneously away from state censorship.
They transformed social media into active political recruitment venue leading to the
historic 2011 mobilization. Moreover, other scholars like John Esposito argued that the
Arab Spring was even an expression of distrust within the mainstream opposition
movements, particularly the Islamists.44 Arab spring at that time as imagined to be led by
liberal young Arabs who seek to democracy rather than establishing Islamic-oriented
political systems based on the failures of Islamic experiences in Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan.
On the other hand, recent studies showed that youth in the Middle East despite
their online activism and international exposure; they lack sense of political organization
and modern values.45 Such readings showed that Arab youth identify themselves as
traditional-religious with high focus on subnational-tribal loyalties. Moreover, several
elections‟ experiences in post-2011 settings showed that Arab youth are not politically
organized to impact decision-making in their respective societies. For instance in Egypt,
43
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following Mubarak‟s ouster, more than 140 political youth coalitions appeared on the
scene; nonetheless they failed to agree on a joint list running for the 2011 parliamentary
elections. As a result Islamists got 72% of the total turnout vote. Between the earlier
presented narratives, this study is trying to map out youth values in chronological context
in the Egyptian case to test such claims employing an empirical perspective.
1.3 Contextualizing Egyptian Youth
In theory, Egyptian youth are considered the critical mass to determine the future
dynamics of politics as James Mattson argued on his scholarship on Arab political
generations in the 1970s.46 In post-2011 settings, questions of legitimacy, income
distribution, and social equality are critical for stability in Egypt. This study is trying to
explore the current features of Egyptian youth and whether their changing values qualify
to provide answers for the 2011 events and predict the potential route of politics in Egypt.
In order to do such task, this section portrays youth demographics and their context of
political socialization.
Demographic Characteristics
One of the major defining features of Egyptian youth is their relative size;
composing a historic bulge that Egypt never witnessed before. Several indicators help in
emphasizing such claim. 62% of Egyptians are below the age of 29 as reported in 2012.47
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Moreover, the average age of total Egyptian population is 25.1 years.48 Reported total
fertility rate is 2.79 between (2010- 2015) in comparison to 5.2 during the period of
(1980- 1985).50 Population growth rate was decreasing during (1980-1985) at 2.28 %.51 It
decreased to be 1.56% during the 1990s, and rose slightly to be 1.68% during (20052010), however it expected to decline and reach 0.69% in (2045-2050). Although fertility
and population growth rates are declining; life expectancy rate is increasing over time
reaching 73.45 years in 2014. All of that is reflected on Egypt‟s population pyramid in
figures (1.1- 1.3); the wide skewed bases signaling youth population are obvious in
figures 1.1 and 1.2, while it is expected to narrow down by (2045- 2050) as shown in
figure 1.3.52
Figure 1.1 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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Figure 1.2 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2014

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Figure 1.3 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2045

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

As shown in the above figures, current Egyptian youth cohort is demographically
overrepresented and expected to be in such case over the next three decades at least. We
argue that Egypt‟s youth population values are vital for any potential political
arrangements in the country. Moreover, Egypt‟s current political generation is more
urban and educated. Although present population distribution is inclined towards rural
sort of residency, yet the internal migration waves towards urban parts of the country are
obvious in the last two decades. Rural-Urban migration is estimated to be around 13.1%
of total population movement between 1986 and 1996; however these numbers are
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defining feature of Egyptian population if compared to growth rates at the time.
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Moreover, inter-urban migration is the highest during Egypt‟s recent history; it ranges
between 64.3% at 1976 to 60.4% according to the 1996 census.
In terms of education, youth literacy rate54 increased dramatically to reach
87.51% in 2010 in comparison to 51.03 % in 1976.55 Moreover, total number of enrolled
students at higher education institutes in Egypt was around 2.02 million students in 2004,
with 49% females.56 In addition, it is not only the gross number of enrollment at different
schooling levels that matters; however the content and quality of education is very
indicative per se. Along with private and international schools for primary and secondary
education; Egyptian public universities during the mid-1990s developed special
language-based programs to privatize education and increase its quality. Therefore, there
is a qualitative improvement in addition to the quantitative progression in Egyptian
educational system.
Young Egyptians now are more connected to the world through cyber
engagement. It resulted in creating parallel-virtual political spheres in which they act and
express freely in away from the formal restricted conventional public sphere. One

53

Ayman Zohry, “Rural to Urban Labor Migration: A Study of Upper Egyptian Laborers in Cairo,
Unpublished Dphil thesis, University of Sussex, 2002, pp. 29-31.
54

Youth Literacy Rate: the percentage of people ages (15-24) who can read and write a short, simple
statement on their everyday life.
55

“Literacy in Egypt”, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Institute for Statistics, http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/countryprofile.aspx?regioncode=40525&code=EGY, Retrived May 20, 2015.
56

Women in Education, Egypt‟s State Information Service,
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=838#.VWJ5ydJViko, Retrieved
May 20, 2015.

27

indicator for that is internet usage in Egypt.57 It is estimated that about 40 million
Egyptians use internet during July 2014.58 Internet usage increased by 490% between
2002 and 2005, and then fluctuating at the 30-40% level till it reached relative stagnation
at 10% from 2013 to 2014. In addition, it is estimated that there are more than 100
million mobile subscribers in Egypt with average 17% annual growth in this booming
sector.59 Moreover, 10.87% of those users are estimated to use mobile internet in August
2012. Social media networks are very popular in Egypt; “Facebook” is the most used
with total penetration rate of 16.5% in 2014.60 Egypt‟s active “Facebook” users are
estimated to be about 12.9 million in 2014 and “Twitter” users are 510,000 thousands
during the same period. It is important to mention that Egypt‟s social media share is the
highest within the Arab world with about 24%.
Political Socialization of Egypt’s Millennial Youth
Egypt‟s millennial political generation has pushed through certain sociopolitical
context that differs structurally from their older peers. Most of literature on political
socialization focuses on age between 11 and 15 years old in the person‟s life; being
regarded as the starting point to encounter politics.61 Thus, if we take Egypt‟s generation
aging between (18- 35) between 2000 and 2013 as the data in hand entails; their
57
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formative political period ranges through 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, we aim in
this section to elaborate the context in which current Egypt‟s youth have pushed through.
An important feature of Egypt‟s political history in the last three decades is the
role of its ruler Hosni Mubarak; although the political system was designed as “semipresidential” according to the 1971 constitution, however in reality it was a one-man
show. Egypt‟s political system under Mubarak was characterized mainly by stagnation; I
would owe much of that to the Mubarak‟s personal characteristics who is considered to
be the longest serving ruler of Egypt since 1850.62 That was reflected on providing no
hope for successive political generations in Egypt.
1980s was marked by Egypt‟s isolation from its Arab milieu following the peace
agreement with Israel in 1978. Like his predecessor (Anwar Al-Sadat), Mubarak
continued his liberal-economic policies with a desire to end the gigantic foreign external
debt Egypt faced at the time. On the other hand, his early promises on political
liberalization were proved wrong; two successive parliaments were dissolved in 1987 and
1990 respectively with the danger of Islamic insurgency in horizon. At the same time, he
kept ruling the country under emergency law that eliminates nearly all sorts of political
opposition and freedom of expression.63
During the 1990s, securitization of public sphere was prioritized over political
bargaining. Faced with the threat of Islamist insurgencies, Mubarak relied on security
forces to deal with waves of terrorism and sectarian violence. Many assassination
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attempts for liberal figures were in display, such as the head of parliament professor Dr.
Refa‟at al-Mahgoub and Farag Fouda, a political liberal writer who publicly criticized
Islamist-Jihadi groups. Even Mubarak himself survived an assassination attempt in
Ethiopia in 1995.

64

At the same time, Egypt started its “privatization” program in 1991

to treat its mal-functioning economy.65 However, by the end of the twentieth century,
Egypt‟s debt doubled with high rate of unemployment due to the inefficient handling of
the privatization program.
During the 2000s, it was Mubarak‟s third term in power, and started containing
political opposition in various ways, following Albrecht and Schlumberger‟s
“liberalization/de- liberalization” explanation.66 Both scholars argued that after promises
for political openness, authoritarian rulers restrict political freedoms in their route to
sustain their power. Furthermore, the visibility of Gamal Mubarak –Mubarak‟s son- in
politics further instigated public discontent; coupled with the rise of his capitalist
coalition that ruled Egypt through Ahmed Nazif‟s government from 2004 to 2011.
Another important development is the reaction towards major catastrophes and corruption
cases that Egypt faced during mid-2000s. In early 2006, the “MS al-Salam Boccaccio 98”
Egyptian ferry sank in the red sea, leaving about 1400 deaths.67 The government did not
64
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react and the ferry owner was allowed to escape the country after allegations of his
relation to Gamal Mubarak and his membership in the ruling National Democratic Party
(NDP) heading committee.
It is obvious that circumstances surrounding youth political socialization since the
1980s are turbulent and likely to affect their behavior and value expressions. I would
argue that one important feature of Egypt‟s history under Mubarak is the “condition of
uncertainty,” shared by many of Egyptians, particularly the youth.

As the political

system restricted prospects of reform and youth‟s future were dependent on one person
who never mapped out a clear path for the future. I believe that such condition led to the
2011 mobilization that aimed to put an end to such cognitive danger.
1.4 Inglehart’s Value Change Thesis
In this section, I present the guiding framework that influenced much of this study
in principle. Following the World War II; competing paradigms of modernization and
dependency aiming to accelerate economic development were in display. Modernization
theory with its linear evolutionary laws was criticized heavily by the dependency school
that the “metropolis” or international western capitalism is the main reason for the
underdevelopment happening in the periphery states. 68 However, the post-cold war epoch
coupled with the rise of South East Asian economies regained credibility in the
modernization view. From this ontological perspective, Inglehart‟s work stems out.
However, Inglehart rejected some of the simplistic laws of modernization in his works
after the 1990s. He considered social and culture changes owed to modernization as
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path-dependent. Moreover, such evolutionary changes are yet to take place in the longterm development of a given society. Thus, Inglehart though criticizing traditional
modernization view, he can still be considered as a strong believer in modernization
effects in a prolonged manner. Modernization is the dominant approach to the study of
values in the literature. However, this research utilizes it as an outlining frame to
approach its problematic inquiry. In another words, modernization help us in
understanding the casual mechanisms behind values formulation and change. However,
we argue through it this reaserach that the universal views of modernization do not hold
right in explaining all youth values in Egypt. Furthermore, we add several assumptions
from the literature to further adjust Inglehart‟s original thesis and help us in our study
quest.
Inglehart based his changing values thesis on the Maslowan notion of hierarchy of
needs.69 Abraham Maslow noted that physiological needs are satisfied in a hierarchal
progressive way from the lower order to the highest rank.70 Drawing on such conception;
Inglehart‟s hypothesis argues that there is a “postmaterialist” value shift among younger
generations whose formative years‟ formulated after World War II due to unprecedented
economic prosperity. For older cohorts born before the war, economic threats raised
safety needs. However, younger cohorts‟ priorities are coined by set of “post-bourgeois”
values reflecting needs for belonging and intellectual expression demands.71
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Inglehart‟s thesis is based on the primacy of the causality between socioeconomic
development and generational value change. As socioeconomic progress changes
society‟s substantial basis and its social fabric, it is directly tied the conception of
existential security. Inglehart agrees with Milton Rokeach‟s definition of values as the
desirable modes of conduct that shape human goals, therefore affect one‟s behavior.72
Moreover, cultural anthropologists like Durham and others consider value change to be
an evolutionary process as reflective for the prevailing conditions of existence.
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This

understanding adopted by Inglehart entails that value orientations reflect existential living
conditions. Moreover, if these conditions are to change, values will change as well but in
a prolonged-time lag after the experience of new life strategies and conditions. Such
change is arguably to be adopted by the young more than the elderly, as the latter hardly
abandon their surviving traditions and ontological views, but once the new life strategies
merge with new modes of thinking, the young will adapt with their new existential
conditions.
Moreover, socioeconomic development reduces constraints on the human abilities
in terms of independence, imagination and choice.74 As it decreases material constraints
on human options and elevates the level of existential security, coupled with the increase
in the level of formal education, and access to information through different forms of
media. In addition, it increases working specialization and social involvedness which is
reflected on more diversified human interactions.
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Industrialization initiates bureaucratization and secularization, while the
movement towards post-industrialization emphasizes individual autonomy and selfexpression values. These cultural changes reshape people‟s political orientations towards
authority, but rather in different ways.75 The shift in human values accompanying the
industrialization phase is attributed to the breakthrough in technology and different
means of control over human conditions. As in pre-industrial societies, it was a game
against nature, while in industrial societies, the control over nature and production
decreased the role assigned to religious beliefs, as materialistic ideologies gave raise to
secular interpretations of history and increased emphasis on human created bureaucratic
organizations. Thus, the shift towards secular values from traditional religious beliefs is
likely to occur.
In the process of post-industrialization, production outcomes are not yet material;
rather they are in forms of ideas, innovative services and knowledge. In addition the
mode of occupational division is not mechanical anymore; rather it occurs through an
organic working environment. Hence, progression of existential economic conditions is
more profound than in the industrialization phase; consequently changed people‟s values
in a different way. This emancipative process allowed people to be more autonomous,
with more options, and skeptic of authority.
The prevalence of post-materialist values is not a universal phenomenon.
Different nations experience different levels and patterns of technological and economic
change, the emerging postmaterialist values are likely to prevail mainly in developed
nations. This takes us to the Egyptian case, as well as the cases of other developing
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nations where the uneven socioeconomic development values effects within the same
generation is not accounted exclusively for Inglehart‟s thesis.
Adjusting Inglehart’s Thesis
This thesis‟s quest is to test Inglehart‟s intergenerational value change hypothesis
in the developing context of post-2011 Egypt. Moreover, this thesis explores the presence
of post-materialist values among Egyptian societal sectors while acknowledging that
reactionary stances towards such expected values shift are prevalent among other
segments of the society.
Inglehart's thesis overlooks the effects of persistent cultural traits including
religion, and the scholarship on pre-materialist values in terms of political socialization in
which socioeconomic progression is relatively low. This thesis attempts to broaden the
analysis through the inclusion of these kinds of effects. Hence, this study is trying to
further problematize such value change thesis in the developing world by accounting for
the role of political attitudes and social values in explaining generational differences.
Samir Amin

argued that Egypt historically did not enter the international

capitalist system until the national bourgeois imposed revised division of labor on
imperial power. With such process, and the uneven industrialization effects led to the
creation of “developed pockets,” within the developing economy. Thus, projecting that
on this reaserach, we expect to find that the Egyptian society still contain such developed
pockets attached to the international capitalist economy and in turn more globalized in
the modern sense, while other segments are marginalized based on their relative
socioeconomic status within this dual industrialized process. This entails different levels
of socioeconomic development and consequently value holdings. Consequently, we
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expect to find varying effects for economic development among specific sectors, while
most of Egyptians still relate themselves to traditional-materialist values and that goes for
the youth as well. Finally, the thesisthesis below considers Inglehart‟s framework only as
a guiding outline for the study of intergenerational value change in Egypt, however I tend
to use other political and social indicators to map out Egyptian youth values and explain
existing cohort differences.
1.5 Problematization and Objectives
This study‟s subsequent sections and chapters base its analysis of youth values on
the conception of political generation. A generation which is defined subjectively as
members of the same birth cohort –following Mannheim‟s definition- qualifies to explain
changing values in the Egyptian case. Our main inquiry in this study is to answer the
following question:
“Are youth political values different from older generation(s)? If they are
different; in which manner?”
By integrating Inglehart‟s typology of postmaterialist versus materialist values
thesis, we develop another set of sub-questions:
- Do the same pattern(s) of youth values in the developed world hold for Egypt?
- Can Inglehart‟s typology explain youth values in Egypt? If not, what are the
main values that help in explaining cohort differences?
Furthermore, Egyptian youth values are perceived to be fragmented, i.e. not
holding the same value patterns due to the internal socioeconomic variations, and effects
of different stratifiers like class-system, education level, gender, place of residency, and
36

religion. For example, while some Egyptian youth hold post-materialist values, others go
ultra-conservative joining the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) or Jerusalem Supporters
(JS). Also, the thesis aim at explaining the 2011 uprising in Egypt, through posing the
following questions:
1. What are the underlying factors that drive Egyptian youth in different
directions?
2. Can the events of January 2011 in Egypt be explained by changing youth
values?
In addition to the qualitative reasoning used throughout this thesis‟s sections, it
mainly relies on empirical demonstration of youth values using various data-sets based on
its availability. In that sense, I depend on the following main hypotheses:
Hypothesis A: Youth holds different political values than older generations both
in Egypt and the world.
Hypothesis B: The structure of youth values in Egypt is different from other
societies
Hypothesis C: Egyptian youth values are fragmented due to uneven effects of
socioeconomic development, where the increase in socioeconomic status is associated to
higher expressions of postmaterialist values.
Hypothesis D: Religion is essential in explaining youth values trends in Egypt,
where higher levels of religiosity are likely to yield traditional-material values
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Objectives
This study takes up the mission of realizing the following interrelated goals:
i) Applying the generational perspective to map the Egyptian youth values in the
new millennium that led ultimately to the January 2011 events.
ii) It attempts to cluster Egyptian youth value trends in comparison to older
generations and to the mainstream trajectories of international youth through
employing Roland Inglehart‟s intergenerational value change thesis.
iii) The study‟s contribution is yet an analytical one tackling the issue of the
youth from an empirical/generational perspective that is under-researched in
this part of the world.
iv) It contributes to the literature on democratization in MENA through mapping
Egyptian youth values related to democratization, political Islam, and gender
equality. Thus, to foresee effects of youth on democratic potential in Egypt.
1.6 Data and Methodology
This study is using secondary data from five different surveys conducted in Egypt
during the period between July 2000 and March 2013. Data sources are respectively; the
World Values Survey (WVS), the Arab Barometer (AB). All of these data sets are free to
use according to the agreement conditions on each of the above reaserach project
websites. Data characteristics are shown in Table 1.1:
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Table 1.1 Survey Data on Egypt between 2000 and 2013
Project

Sample Size

Survey Date

Response
Rate

Estimated
Error

Data Collection
Agency

WVS

3000

July 2000January 2001

N/A

+/- 1.8 %

EMAC Research
and Training

3051

March- April
2008

N/A

N/A

Survey Unit at
IDSC

1523

March- April
2012

N/A

+/- 2.6 %

TNS Egypt

1200

June 2011

100%

+/- 3 %

Al-Ahram Center
(ACPSS)

1200

FebruaryMarch 2013

71.6%

+/- 2.8 %

Mada Foundation

Wave 478

WVS
Wave 579

WVS
Wave 680

AB
81

Wave II

AB
Wave III

82

Note: Since not all of the above data sets are probably weighted, we weighted the WVS
4, 5, and 6 datasets around the 2006 Egypt‟s census demographic characteristics issued by the
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 83

As per the mathematical definition of political generations, we used a mediatory
method to define youth in relevance to the data hand. The Population Council which
conducted the Survey of Young People in Egypt defines this category to include those
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between the ages of (15-29).84 On the Other hand, Mannheim's conception of the young's
formative years to be between the ages of (18-25), whereas the individual transcends to
the adulthood phase, and starts facing reality. While Mark Tessler in his study on
Morocco‟s political generations set the age of 35 years to be the threshold between
younger and older political generations. We used a mediatory technique to count for
generational gabs ranging between (10-14-19) years in the attempt to produce more stable
attitude analysis over the different waves of surveys in use.

Hence, in exploring

postmaterialism values, I defined the youth as those falling within the age bracket of (1630) following the CAPMAS weights in hand of the WVS on Egypt, while in assessing
political, religious and social attitudes; I used a range of (18-35) to explain youthful
orientations due to the weights of the AB II and III .

Method of Analysis
Throughout the research below, we rely on multiple approaches of analysis, given
that there is no single indicator, or analytical method can solely explain a social
complicated phenomenon such as attitude formation and value change.
In analytical empirical discussions, we used several dependent, independent,
control and interaction variables using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models
in order to explain the effect of different predictors on our parameters that reflect youth
values in Egypt over survey pools. In addition, for the sake of constructing world and
regional maps of postmaterialism, I used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in which
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common features reflecting Inglehart‟s typologies where derived from country mean
scores. I used both SPSS and STATA statistical applications in all the following analyses.
In conclusion, this study follows the subsequent line of inquiry; I first examine the
trends of postmaterialist values in the world at the present moment and its relevance to
Egyptian youth. I show how Egyptian youth values patterns are placed in their regional
and global contexts. Then, I provide different manifestations on youth‟s political value
differences in terms of trust, efficacy, and democracy and possible explanations for such
trends. Moreover, I project the role of religiosity on Egyptian youth and its effects on
activism and gender tolerance. Finally, I project youth value change and it relevance to
the Arab Spring events and account for fragmentation among the young in Egypt.
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CHAPTER II
POSTMATERIALISM IN EGYPT
In this chapter, I aim to place postmaterialist value portfolio in Egypt within its
global and regional contexts. In sections below, I explain thoroughly the underpinnings of
such values and its current status in the world, producing a world cultural map
complementing the earlier work presented by Inglehart. Then, I trace value shift in the
Middle East based on socioeconomic causality. Finally, I provide insights on the level of
postmaterialism among Egyptian youth and its main predictors.
2.1 Postmaterialism in a Comparative Perspective
The causal relation amongst social, economic and political vicissitudes is integral
in the literature of social sciences. Ever since the Marxist doctrine on the primacy of
economic infrastructure in shaping values and norms; this controversial debate never was
outdated. Although a Marxist proletarian class never ruled out in due course of history,
yet the primacy of socioeconomic causation implies some degree of predictably on the
mode of global value change. This section aims at portraying the structure of
postmaterialist values at the turn of the new millennium in a comparative perspective to
serve as a starter to detect such trend in Egypt afterwards. This work is one hand novel in
the context of the Middle East. In addition, it adds to the already existing earlier cultural
maps developed by Inglehart and Welzel before.
Modernization Theory: Re-visited
For Karl Marx, production relations within class-systems are the infrastructure in
any given society that influences the superstructure including state, culture, and legalities
that reflects interests of a given dominant class, and through process of class-antagonism,
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change is achieved. 86 On the contrary, Emile Durkheim who is more of a sociologist was
concerned with studying the patterns of stability than change in respective societies.87. In
another line of thought, Max Weber confronted both Marx and Durkheim arguing that
ideas can actually shape economic conditions under specific conditions through the
introduction of the concept of “Verstehen” or understanding in German.88 Weber noted
that through understanding the motivations behind actions, ideas can influence economic
and political behavior. Still, recent inputs from scholars like Samuel Huntington, Robert
Putnam, and Francis Fukuyama noted that regardless any kind of socioeconomic cultural
variations caused by industrialization, cultural traditions are persistent mainly in orthodox
societies and ultimately shape economic and political behavior per se.89
Postwar underdevelopment in the south is owed to the persistence of traditional
economy, psychological and cultural traits in any given society.90 Thus, for any given
society to develop, it has to follow the western capitalist model of modernization.
However other neo-structuralist scholars, such as Wallerstein, regarded modernization as
an outdated explanation of the underdevelopment in poor countries.91 The postwar
modernization version failed to account for the external causes of underdevelopment.
World-systems theorists owed the uneven center-periphery socioeconomic development
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to the exploitation of world capitalism.92 However, such perception has been under
criticism itself, as Evans noted that global division of labor and inclusion into
international trade can stimulate economic growth, and provide welfare portfolio for
developing countries as well.
The post-cold war period coupled with the economic boom in South East Asian
regained the credibility of the westernized version of modernization theory. Yet,
Inglehart and others noted for the need to revisit the classical version of it to match the
new global developments, for example Inglehart believes that Russia and China are likely
to democratize because of the long-term effects of socioeconomic growth on individuals‟
behaviors, thus the institutional manifestation of such values will take place. 93 He
advocated for the internal fallacies within the main stream underpinnings of
modernization in terms of the perquisites that assume certain level of “modern” values
for a given society to progress.94 On the other hand, he did not adopt the neo-Marxist
stances that owed the underdevelopment of the poor countries to the exploitation by the
rich capitalist north.
The process of industrialization leads to cultural shifts, yet this change is path
dependent, i.e. not uniform.95 Cultural zones primarily designed by Samuel Huntington,
and later on used by Inglehart prove to have a stabilizing effect on the worldwide post92
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materialist value change. Thus, Inglehart doubts the modernization forces‟ capability of
producing a global culture in the near future. Second, the growing trend of antisecularism is overlooked. Theoretically, processes of industrialization and postindustrialization yields less emphasis on the traditional religious values, yet a growing
interest in the meaning and purpose of life provides a counterbalanced effects. Third, the
path dependency of value change is present within each cultural zone itself, not only
cross-cultural. Finally, the mode and magnitude of value change is dependent on various
factors, yet the distinction between long/short term value changes is highly important.
Long-term value changes are likely to occur, with no necessary westernized
“Americanization” turnover in world values. Thus, unlike the first phase of
modernization theory, the post-industrial version of modernization increases the demand
for democracy and little government interference with remarkable human autonomy.
The Postmaterialism Thesis
By late 1970s, Inglehart developed a technique to understand the value changing
trends all over the world. He did not fell into the trap of unicultural attributes, and to
overcome the hardships connected with the usage of culture as residual variable, he rather
focused on long-term effects of socioeconomic development, which is fairly stable to
overcome the legitimate criticism of the fluctuation and fragmentation of the culturist
approaches.96 It started with his silent revolution thesis, observing a value change towards
post-materialism analyzing the Euro barometer, then he considered more as a cultural
shift by the end of the cold war, and by early 2000s, he started to revisit his original thesis
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by accounting for the short-term effects of inflation and its temporal effects on long-term
post-material value standings.97
In theory, the central claim of modernization is that economic prosperity leads to
change in worldwide values in a predictable mode.98 The heavy reliance on
industrialization is to yield occupational specialization, high levels of education, rising
economic growth. These effects change the existential living conditions of individuals in
any given society. Modernization is a budding course of human development forced by
socioeconomic progression; it brings cultural change in terms of gender roles, authority
perceptions, sexual norms, religious beliefs, and more participation in the polity‟s affairs.
It likely yields a new form of society that is more emancipative than earlier forms of
societal progression.99 Such changes according to Inglehart are not under any control,
thus elites or military leaders might think of limiting its effects, yet it is more profound
and hard to be restricted.
On the other hand, post-materialism is linked to the changing nature of work and
economy into post-industrial developments. Daniel Bell noted that the changes in nature
of economic transactions in the postwar epoch, where a shift towards service products
take over businesses all over the world.100 Such shift has major political, economic and
social consequences. The more secure existential living conditions drives human value to
focus on quality of life, environmentalism and self-expression, or in another words what
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Inglehart regarded as postmaterialist values. The pre-industrial life is dominated by
conflict against nature, thus more emphasis on traditional-religious values. Furthermore
with complexities in economic transactions, humans manipulated their nature. This gave
the rise of material ideologies that focuses on secular-rational interpretations of history.
The shift towards post-industrial mode of production gave the rise of more autonomous
explanations of history, where more and more people lives in mechanic societies, thus it
becomes a game against persons.101
Findings of the WVS enhance the hypothesis on the Human Development
Sequence as shown in figure 2.1 based on the rise of post-materialism in postwar
developed societies. The core theme of broadening human choices by elevating social,
material and cognitive constraints on human calculations results a socioeconomic change,
rising values towards of self-expression, and growing trend of democratization. The
socioeconomic modernization process decreases objective capabilities on humans that
escalates people‟s autonomous choices. Changing global values gives more emphasis on
individual liberty, allows for human diversity, in other words “self-expression” values.
This syndrome of values focuses on civil and political liberties which comprises
democracy. It allows people the flexibility to be more autonomous, thus realizing
freedom of speech and action. The rise of self-expression in short qualifies modernization
to be an emancipative process of human development.
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Figure 2.1 Process of Human Development

Source: Christian Welzel, Focal Point Human Development: On the Foundations
of Democracy and the Causes of its Spread (German), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002, p.
46.

World Cultural Map in the New Millennium
Inglehart based on a conviction of the changing nature of world values towards
postmaterialism has set different mechanisms to test his proposed thesis. The centrality of
rising self-expression values in post-industrial societies provides an adequate indicator to
see such related effects. As in such societies; services and knowledge-based businesses
are prevailing, workers deal with binary codes, symbols and ideas; thus more freedom to
take decisions and open up for new ideas. Moreover, the social safety net that surrounds
new life conditions changes the existential threats that face the post-industrial individuals
resulting in upgrading their human development syndrome as proposed by Inglehart. On
the other hand and despite of globalization, the realization of self-expression and secular
values is not yet homogenous around the world. In many parts of the world due to
economic stagnation, individuals do not prioritize such post-materialist values.102
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In this section, I use Inglehart‟s technique to trace the changes of world values
related to the rise of post-materialism in the world at the turn of the new millennium to
assess the global trend of such values, and then I classify it geographically rather than
Inglehart‟s classification that rests on Huntington‟s cross-cultural clash units.
Subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall; Samuel Huntington, Robert Putnam and others
noted the persistence of cultural traditions over the simplistic conviction of homogenous
international culture.103 Huntington classified the world into major cultural zones that
includes; western-Christians, Orthodox part, Islamic world, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu,
African and Latin American Zones. In this part I developed the same dimensions used by
Inglehart to assess the shift in post-industrial societies to place different parts of the world
in this cross-cultural variation values comparison.
I used data from the 6th wave of the WVS conducted between 2010 and 2014 to
compare it to Inglehart‟s earlier work on the same dimensions. I use PCA method to
extract two dimensions reflecting “traditional versus secular-rational” values on the one
hand, while the other indicates “survival versus self-expression” on the national level.104
Table 2.1 presents the factor loadings of these ten items and the description of the twoextracted dimensions.

103

Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,‟‟ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, pp. 22-40.

104

Questions wording are in appendices A and B.

49

Table 2.1 Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation: National-Level

Factor
Loadings
Traditional values emphasize the following
(Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite)106
God is very important for respondent

.484

It is more important for children to learn obedience and religious faith .337
than independence and determination (Autonomy Index)
Abortion is never justified
.324
Respondent has a strong national pride

.683

Respondent favors more respect for authority

.504

Survival values emphasize the following
(Self-expression values emphasize the opposite)107
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self- .495
expression and quality of life (4-item postmaterialist index)
Respondent feels not very happy
.326
Homosexuality is never justified

.745

Respondent did not and would not sign a petition

.539

Respondent is careful about trusting other people

.359

Note: World Values Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014)

As table 2.1 shows, the two extracted factors loaded quiet lower in my extracted
PCA components than Inglehart‟s earlier works of 1997 and 2005, as it loaded above
(0.6) in his earlier work. I owe such results to the effect of missing data that is estimated
to be about 12%; where the statistical application used here Statistical Package for Social
Sciences (SPSS) excludes countries that contain missing items.
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with valid data for that pair. The model scored (.761) on Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of samplingadequacy test. Bartlett‟s test of sphericity chi-square scored (56118.077) at p<0.05.
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correlated at r=0.514. The logic behind selecting these ten items –same as Inglehart- is
the consistency of these questions across the WVS.
In order to produce a world cultural map at 2014 that assesses postmaterialist
value rankings around the world according to the earlier extracted factors, I then
extracted the arithmetic mean scores of countries of the WVS sixth wave, and then place
them graphically. For the sake of such analysis, country cases were weighted around
1500 observations per nation. And due to the effect of missing data, only 50 countries
produced means, thus 16.4% of the data were excluded due to pairwise exclusion
technique, leaving the final cases to be (N=65183). Missing values as mentioned above
affects the number of eligible countries, as it was excluded automatically on the factor
loading analysis.109
Results of the countries‟ mean score values of over the two extracted dimensions;
emphasizes the same pattern discussed in Inglehart‟s work of 1997 and 2005; where
higher scores on the two dimensions is found among developed high-income countries.110
In accordance with the world development indicators of 2015, the countries of high
economic status scored the highest on the estimated means of the post-materialism
dimensions.111 Figure 2.2 represents the countries‟ mean scores on two axes; the
horizontal one indicates progression towards “Self-Expression” values, while the vertical
axis tends towards “Secular-Rational” values. Both progressive values tend towards the
positive pole.

109

2000 World Cultural Map in appendix C

110

Full list of mean countries scores on Inglehart‟s dimensions are in appendix D.

111

World Growth, World Development Indicators 2015, pp. 80-82.
50

The following figure is represented in geographical terms rather than Inglehart‟s
earlier reliance on Huntington‟s cultural zones. The logic behind such classification is
that I believe that the cultural-zones classification is subjective, geographical zones is
more valid. Moreover it shows that Middle East is scoring lowest on both dimensions, in
another words, one can grasp that peoples of such region face direct economic hardship
particularly in the past four years following the political instability in this part of the
world resulting in the focus on survival values, with reliance on traditional values expect
for deviant cases such as Lebanon. On the other hand, Western Europe and North
America scores are the highest on both dimensions. It reflects a higher level of existential
security and social safety net, thus more emphasis on rationality and self-expression
values are reported. Other parts of the world scores differently and in turn placed over
diverse parts on the graph. South East Asia countries scores just below North America,
which means that this part of the world is rapidly changing its value identification as
result of the mid-1990s economic prosperity. The figure in general matches our original
assumption that the high degree of modernity in terms of value expression is related to
socioeconomic progression.
To sum up, the growing trend of postmaterialism at the turn of the new
millennium is still prevalent; however the magnitude of such progression is different
from one part of the world to another. While scores are really high in Western Europe
and North America, the Middle East region is still scoring negatively on both dimensions.
This growing trend which results in changing gender, political, and individualistic values
can be contested in developing states as latter sections will show. Scores on Inglehart‟s
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survival/self-expression and traditional/secular-rational dimensions show variations in
cultural homogeny of post-materialist values that he predicted before.
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Figure 2.2 Mean of Country Scours on Cross-Cultural Value Variations (World Map)
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Value Change in the Middle East
In this study‟s quest to place Egyptian values within a wider global and regional
context. I believe it‟s of a great importance to compare Egyptian value system to other
states in MENA given the commonalties among these states in terms of culture, economy
and the nature of respective political regimes.
Figure 2.3 represents the location of MENA countries on Inglehart‟s dimensions
from 2000 till 2014.112 Vertical axis represents variation from traditional to secularrational values towards the positive pole, while horizontal axis represents variation from
survival to self-expression values. The reason for the incomprehensive representation in
the below figure, i.e. missing countries, is due to large number of missing cases in wave 6
(2010-2014); thus, much of the respective country scores cannot be obtained. In addition,
questions did change from wave to another, yet I tried to stick to Inglehart-Welzel
original items in the 1997 and 2005 dimensions for comparison reasons. The figure
shows Egypt‟s value system changing from 2001 to 2008 on the self-expression
continuum, and slightly towards secular-rational values. A plausible explanation for that
is the growing disconnect with government‟s economic and social policies during the
Ahmed Nazif second‟s cabinet with remarkable increase in the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth rates explained earlier. Thus, an obvious movement on the horizontal axis
is noted, while degrees of conservatism are still maintain. However, it is important to
bear in mind that Egypt‟s scores lies in the (negative) area on the aggregate dimensions.
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Figure 2.3 Mean of MENA Country Scores on Inglehart‟s Model (2000-2014)
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In fact most of the countries in the region scores negatively on both dimensions
expect for both Lebanon (2010-2014) and Israel (2000-2004). While both Iraq and
Tunisia changed their scores to be positive on the secular-rational dimension in (20102014), yet they still negatively scores on the self-expression dimension. An important
remark as well, is that Qatar (2010-2014) and Saudi Arabia (2000-2004) scores the
highest among other Arab states on the self-expression dimension. I argue that it does not
necessarily mean a shift towards postmaterialist values, however it reflects a high level of
existential security related to the oil-revenues that such states acquire.113 Arab spring
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states, such as Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt scores higher than other states on the
secular-traditional dimension, with less development on the self-expression axis. Hence,
the above figure can lead us to assume that there is a limited movement towards more
expression values in the Middle East.
2.2 Value System(s) in Egypt
By early 2000s, Egypt has been through considerable change in its political,
economic and social spheres. This wave of transformation had its impact on the Egyptian
society. Although many highlighted the post-millennial transformations in Egypt, yet
little work accounted for the changing nature of changing values of the Egyptian society.
In the section below, I start by highlighting the sociopolitical background of Egypt in the
post 2000 epoch, then I account for the aggregate/disaggregate value change in Egypt
based on Inglehart‟s Postmaterialism indices. Other than filling the knowledge gap on the
structure of Egyptian value system, this section further aims at providing an overview on
the current settings of Egyptian value systems.
Socioeconomic and Political Background
Since 1978 peace agreement with Israel and the adoption of the Infitah “OpenEconomy” during Sadat‟s reign (1970-1981), the Egyptian society has transformed
dramatically given its earlier socialist attachments prioritized by President Gamal AbdelNasser (1954-1970).114 Mubarak –coming from the same institutional background and
formerly served as Sadat‟s deputy- as mentioned earlier continued in his predecessor‟s
economic strategies. The composition of successive governments under Mubarak reveals
such fact as well. Table 2.2 shows list of cabinets under Mubarak in which most of the
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head of these governments were technocrats or university professors affiliated with the
NDP adopted neo-liberal economic policies. Successive governments in Egypt aimed at
coping with the International Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) structural adjustments accords and
the regime willingness at that time to integrate Egypt‟s economy into world trade and
alleviate the external debt.
Table 2.2 List of Cabinets under Mubarak since 1986

Prime Minster

Government Term

Political Affiliation

Atef Sedky
Kamal Elganzouri
Atef Ebeid
Ahmed Nazif

1986-1996
1996-1999
1999-2004
2004-2011

NDP
NDP
NDP
NDP

Source: Former Prime Ministers of Egypt, Egyptian Cabinet,
http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/Cabinet/Former.aspx, Retrived May 2, 2015.

In order for the Mubarak regime to face the chronic external debt that Egypt
suffered from since the 1960s. Successive governments since the 1990s took harsh
macro-economic measures mainly in the form of cutting public spending and
privatization. However, the Egyptian economy entered a stagnation period by the end of
the 1990s due to political instability and lack of investments. Thus, since 2004; Nazif‟s
cabinet had to rethink its Macroeconomic strategy, as to focus on deregulation in terms of
trade regulations, tax system and investment portfolio to attract private and foreign
investments.115 Coupled with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his direct/ indirect
involvement in both NDP and Nazif‟s cabinet economic planning, Egypt GDP growth
rate reached 7.2% in 2008 representing the highest value in 25 years.116 Moreover, World
Bank considered the Egyptian economy as one of the most developing economies in mid115
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2000. See Figure 2.4 below on Egypt‟s GDP annual growth rates (1999-2011), that shows
periods of economic growth and stagnation during the past decade.
Figure 2.4 GDP Growth Rate in Egypt (1999-2011)
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However, the international recognition of the high GDP growth rates did not
reflect in internal political stability or satisfaction with income redistribution given the
earlier waves of privatization and social inequality shared by many sectors in the
Egyptian society especially the workers. Table 2.3 shows the number of worker strikes
from 1999 till 2008, it shows an increase especially during the high economic growth
periods of 2007 and 2008 especially in the private sector. This raises the question of
whether the periods of economic growth in Egypt reflects nominal or real economic
growth and whether it resulted in just income distribution and higher livings standards.
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Table 2.3 Number of Workers‟ Strikes per Sector (1999-2008)

Year
1999
2001
2002
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Government
Sector
13
3
6
8
6
24
21
17
36
37

Public Business
Sector
10
6
8
3
3
10
13
13
31
17

Private Sector

Total

15
9
5
13
16
9
12
17
43
68

54
40
19
24
25
43
46
47
110
112

Source: The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt, Solidarity Center, 2010, pp. 16-17,
www.solidaritycenter.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F02%2Fpubs_egypt_wr1.pdf,
Retrived May 2, 2015.

Politically, the first decade of 2000s was remarkably salient in addition to several
economic developments. In February 2005, Mubarak announced his intention to amend
article 76 of the 1971 constitution which defines the procedures for choosing the
president.117 It allowed for the first time for a direct people‟s vote in selecting the
president. Then in 2007 a set of amendments was passed on the same article that
solidifies the ruling NDP‟s role in selecting the future president of Egypt. 118
These amendments coupled with the visibility of Mubarak Junior, intensified the
narratives on the possible line of succession of power in Egypt, i.e. within Mubarak‟s
117
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family. It was then termed as Altawrith “Inheritance” project.119 Such development gave
a momentum for the rise of social movements to erupt given the restricted nature of the
political regime at that time, Kefaya “Enough” movement -aimed at failing the earlier
mentioned succession project- took the lead in paving the way for various routes of
untamed opposition to appear. Youth movements were formulated from Kefaya and other
protest organizations such as April 6th. These kinds of activities as argued in earlier
sections used secured cyber space to organize and recruit their supporters.
Waves of post-2000 political activism according to Dina Shehata can be identified
in four phases.120 The first phase is closely related to external affairs such as the
Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the war on Iraq 2003, which was manifested in the
March 20th movement that brought thousands of Egyptians into Tahrir square. The
second phase focused on democratization, with the installation of "Kefaya" movement
that adopted unconciliatory notions with the regime, which attracted cross-ideological
youth. The third phase is closely associated with the socioeconomic grievances mainly
manifested in workers' demands, as youth comprehended that grass-rooted social work
might be the mean for change. Finally, the fourth phase is a return to the political sphere
with the timing of succession in the regime from Mubarak to his son.
The earlier mentioned economic and political developments had major
sociopolitical consequences on the Egyptian society in terms of social grievances,
inequality and the rise of new-capitalist elites that took over the formal political sphere.
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Postmaterialism in Egypt
Based on the qualitative assessments presented in earlier sections that indicate the
changing socioeconomic and political milieu of Egyptian and the political socialization of
Egyptian youth, we believe there are enough reasons to assume that Egyptian values are
undergoing process of change as a reflection of existential progression. In this section; I
use Inglehart “Materialism/Postmaterialism” 4-item and 12-item batteries to trace such
value change through the WVS waves of 4, 5 and 6. These indices reflect progression
towards postmaterialism at the positive end. Moreover, for more robustness, Egypt‟s data
were extracted and weighted according to several parameters provided by the
CAPMAS.121 The Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-item index is composed repeated
questions used in successive WVS waves that are classified on the earlier dimensions.122
Question items follow the subsequent order:
1. Maintaining order in the nation;
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions;
3. Fighting rising prices;
4. Protecting freedom of speech;

With these earlier responses, 6 combinations can be reached. Options (2 and 4)
yield postmaterialist values, while items (1 and 3) compose materialist values. The other
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remaining 4 combinations produce mixed-values yielding an additive scale ranging
between -2 and +2, where the latter indicates postmaterialist values.
Projecting such index on the Egyptian case with data available from the WVS;
Table 2.4 represents the distribution of “postmaterialist/materialist” percentages among
the three waves on Egypt. The table clearly reflects a decreasing emphasis on the
postmaterialist values after 2001. In theory, an increasing prioritization of one type of
values is directly linked to a decrease in another set of value type. Where only 0.9% of
Egyptians at 2012 were considered to hold such progressive values, coupled with
growing emphasis on pure materialist values. Such result contradicts the high level of
economic growth reported in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century in
Egypt. In the same line, I constructed a Percentage Difference Index (PDI) 123 scores to
detect aggregate value shifts in Egypt. In the same table, PDI scores are increasing as
well, in particular between 2008 and 2012 to reach -62.4%. Inglehart accounted for shortterm fluctuations in the level of postmaterialist values in given societies as an effect of
inflation. However, I urge with such obvious difference, post-2011 with the political and
economic instability, it led for more emphasis on pure materialist values focusing on
basic needs, thus less attention is assigned to emancipative values.
Table 2.4 Percentages of Postmaterialist/Materialist 4-item Index in Egypt (2001-2012)
Year
Postmaterialist
Mixed
Materialist
(N)
PDI
%
%
%
Score
Index
2001
5.3
48.7
46.1
2461
-40.8
2008
1.7
53.4
44.9
2523
-43.2
2012
0.9
35.8
63.3
2525
-62.4
Source: WVS waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012)

123

PDI= postmaterialist value percentages (minus) materialist value percentages.
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For more visual representation, figure 2.5 shows the same postmaterialist/
materialist 4-item index distribution of the decreasing emphasis of post-materialist effects
in the Egyptian society in bars from 2001 to 2012.
Figure 2.5 Postmaterialist/ Materialist 4-item Index Percentages by Wave in Egypt
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The other index used by Inglehart throughout his thesis is the 12-item value
index.124 This index thought to be more reliable and valid as it shows a wide range of
variability among respondents to account for the short-term inflation effects.125 In
addition to the four-item battery; this index includes other two sets of questions adding up
to 12-items as the following:
1. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth;
2. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces;
3. Seeing that people have more say in how things are decided at work and in their
communities;

124

Questions wording is in appendix D.
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4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

In this set, options (1 and 2) designed as materialist values, while options (3 and
4) yield postmaterialist values. The other set of this index includes:
1. Maintain stable economy;
2. Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society;
3. Fight against crime;
4. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money.

Options (1 and 3) in this set designed to reflect materialist values as well, while
options (2 and 4) yields postmaterialist values. The scores from respective categories on
postmaterialist/materialism are summed up yielding an additive scale from 0 to +5, where
the positive pole reflects postmaterialist values. Table 2.5 shows that the mean values on
the 12-item index in Egypt by wave at three different points of time; 2001, 2008 and
2012. Bearing in mind that a perfect postmaterialist score by individual is achieving score
of (+5), scores at its highest during the early 2000s was 1.68 on average. Moreover,
results show a growing emphasis as well on pure materialist expressions that emphasize
traditional-cultural attachments coupled with the importance of present-day challenges in
terms of economic hardships.
Table 2.5 Mean Scores on Postmaterialist/Materialist 12-Item Index by Wave in Egypt
Year
Mean Score
(N)
2001
1.62
2440
2008
1.42
2514
2012
1.08
2525
Source: WVS Waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012)

In conclusion, overall scores on both 4-item and 12-item postmaterialism batteries
in Egypt show an inverse trend towards materialist values different from the international
trends portrayed in the earlier sections. Although countries in the region scores negatively
on Inglehart‟s cultural map, however I argue that postmaterialism status in Egypt is lower
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than respective Arab states since its turbulent economy dating back to the 1960s.
Moreover, such conclusion is emphasized in the post-2011 epoch due to political
instability and the obvious social grievances expressed by individuals mainly through
sectoral demands. Many scholars and commentators in Egypt argued that sectoral
demands is the real driving force behind the 2011 uprising not liberal progressive
aspirations. Such assumption can be packed by the general scores presented above.
2.3 Youth and Postmaterialism in Egypt
In this section I focus exclusively on youth postmaterialist values in Egypt before
and after the 2011 uprising. As it was believed, the 2011 events aimed at achieving
democracy and political freedoms, thus it can be placed under the category of
postmaterialist “self-expression” values. I control for the age category between (16-30) as
the weight provided through CPAMAS demographics, then I test two general claims, one
is related to effect of age and other is income on postmaterialist values among Egyptian
youth. However, it is worthy to note that overall scores of such values are low in Egypt in
general. Moreover, questions used by Inglehart are not sensitive for developing
communities. For instance, question such as “having more say in government decisions,”
can be regarded as materialist in Egypt in contrast to its classification as postmaterialist
indicator at other understandings in other parts of the world.
Effect of Age in Comparative Context
Much of the literature on long-term patterns of postmaterialist values in western
societies is contingent upon generational replacement. Generational replacements due life
socialization effects are central for Inglehart‟s thesis. Younger generations (cohorts)
replace older ones through an accumulative process of graduation resulting in change in
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political and social attitudes and behaviors of the publics. In this section, I aim to portray
the structure of youth value system in Egypt on both postmaterialist 12-item and 4-item
indices developed by Inglehart. Then, compare it to similar patterns among other young
generations all over the world to assess the plausibility of Inglehart‟s model in explaining
youth value change in Egypt.
I use both 12-item and 4-item postmaterialist indices for more comprehensive
results. They are constructed respectively on scales from (0 to +5) and (-2 to +2) that
possibly sensitive for short-term inflation fluctuations as well. Here, I test my first claim
that there younger generations in Egypt are more likely to hold postmaterialist values in
forms of desire to have more say in politics and active participation in their respective
communities. Since their formative socialization experiences took place during periods of
economic prosperity in comparison to older cohorts.
Hypothesis 1: younger generations are more likely to express postmaterialist
values in comparison to their older peers in Egypt
First, Table 2.6 tests the relationship between postmaterialist values and age in
Egypt through successive waves. Age as continuous variable tends to be highest on its
positive pole, and materialist/postmaterialist indices are positively arranged as explained
before. Cases were weighted based on earlier data –mentioned above- from the 2006
CAPMAS census in Egypt. The results show the same pattern of decreasing emphasis on
postmaterialism among all Egyptian from 2001 to 2008. However, postmaterialist values
increases when age decrease, which matches our original assumption as well as
Inglehart‟s thesis on generational change. Still the magnitude of such association is
relatively low across all waves in Egypt. Association between age and postmaterialism is
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at its maximum in 2001, Pearson coefficient scored r= -0.153 in the 4-item battery and r=
-0.145 in the 12-item battery at 99% confidence level. And trends continue to decline in
subsequent waves as well.
Table 2.6 Correlation between Materialist/Postmaterialist indices and Age
Survey Year
Pearson Coefficient
Age
4-Item Index
12-Item Index
-0.153**
-0.145**
2001
-0.026*
-0.049*
2008
-0.039
-0.017
2012
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001-2008-2012)
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Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item dimension in Egypt is declining since 2001 through
2012. Arithmetic mean scores of the younger cohort (16-30) scores highest on the
continuum among the three different waves. Such result further emphasizes the earlier
correlation between age and the proposed dimensions. However, the trend in the table
matches the original trend on decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values especially
after the 2011 events. Although younger cohort (16-30) scores highest on the continuum,
which explains their differential values in relation to other cohorts, still the decreasing
emphasis on postmaterialism leaves our quest unsolved. It can be owed to short-term
inflation effects mainly that marked the post-2011 epoch. As mentioned above sectoral
demands were at its highest following the uprising. Moreover, since Egypt increased its
internal and external debts following the uprising, it was reflected in decreasing quality
levels of public services, thus many of Egyptians including the youth see direct economic
conditions crucial for life conditions.
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Mean Scores on Postmaterialist 12-Item

Figure 2.6 Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item means scores by Age Categories
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Another simple method is to compare Egyptian youth mean value scores on the
used index to the international means. In 2001, world youth (16-30) mean score value
was 1.93, while Egyptian youth scored 1.8; that indicates that Egyptian youth at the turn
of the millennium was of more open to participate more in the political process and
rethink traditional norms on average level according to the international standards. In
2008, Egyptian youth value mean score was 1.46, while international mean was 1.55.
Thus, still Egyptian youth was near to the average international scores. However, in 2012,
the international mean score was 2.03, whereas Egyptian youth score was 1.08. That
indicates a drastic decrease on the emphasis on postmaterialist values of self-expression
and secularism on the contrary to what was expected in the aftermath of the 2011 events
and related political mobilization. I argue this finding is very important to explain the depoliticization and polarization that Egypt is facing in the aftermath of the uprising after
the overestimation of youth abilities at that time. Additionally, it opens the door for
casting doubt about the youth abilities claim.
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To further test the relationship between age and postmaterialism is to compare
Egyptian youth in its regional and international contexts, thus to be able to answer the
original hypothesis if international youth value trends hold for Egypt or not. I developed
mean scores for countries on the 12-item index for the (16-30) age category based on the
6th wave of WVS (2010-2014).126 Cases were weighted around 1500 to normalize the
results. Cross-national mean scores‟ results were very informative. Bearing in mind that
the international average score on this index is 2.03, results shows that Egyptian youth
values mean score is between the lowest among the 50 countries used in this
measurement. While it scored 1.08 in Egypt, western European countries scored the
highest, for instance Sweden scored 2.81, and 2.14 was the U.S score. Even Arab states
expect for Tunisia and Yemen, scored more than Egypt. Lebanese youth for instance got
2.08, even Libya, Morocco and Iraq scored between (1.77 and 1.68).
Income Effect
In this final section, I test Inglehart‟s main causal mechanism related to the
generational shift towards postmaterialist values, which is the effect of income. As level
of income increases, existential constraints on human minds decreases resulting in
changing values related to gender, sexuality and more deliberative democratic practices.
Thus, my main hypothesis in this section:
Hypothesis 1: higher income levels among young Egyptians, is likely to result in
higher levels of postmaterialist value preferences
I use data from the WVS on waves 4 and 5 that were conducted in Egypt at 2001
and 2008 respectively to construct an OLS regression model only for youth (16-30).
126

Full table is in appendix D.
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Cases were weighted according the 2006 CAPMAS demographic outputs as mentioned
before. Data from 6th WVS wave at 2012 in Egypt were excluded as income and place of
residency variables were not reported by the collecting agency. Dependent variable is the
12-item materialist/postmaterialist index that tends to positive pole, while the main
independent variable is a scaled-income that was reported in local currency from less than
500 Egyptian pounds to more than 12501 pounds per month. Thus, we expect to find
positive correlation between both variables. I use other controls that were reported in
binary forms, education refers to college degree holders, gender refers to females, while
place of residency refers to urban residents.127
Results from table 2.7 on the factors affecting postmaterialism among Egyptian
youth between 2001 and 2008; shows that income is of great explanatory power on our
postmaterialist parameter in 2008, as it explains 0.37 increase in such values if income
increases at 90% confidence level, while at 2001 it was statistically insignificant, this has
to with the high level of economic growth reported between 2005 and 2008, thus those
who has more income are likely to be postmaterialist. In a related vein, high education
level is robust across models, explaining 0.425 in 2001 and 0.417 in 2008 the increase in
such values at 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively, only males are more
supportive of such values in 2001 which I think has to do with the higher level of social
security among males at the turn of the millennium in comparison to females.
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Table 2.7 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Postmaterialism among Youth in Egypt

2001
Model 1
-0.008
(0.017)
0.425**
(0.152)
-0.209**
(0.075)
-0.007
(0.074)
1.905***
(0.101)

2008
Model 1
0.37 *
(0.017)
0.417***
(0.115)
0.091
(0.069)
-0.017
(0.083)
1.221***
(0.085)

R2

0.017

0.026

N

912

900

Income
College Degree
Gender (=female)
Urban
Intercept

Note: standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: WVS (2001 and 2008) on Egypt

Ultimately,

I

conclude

the

following

remarks

on

the

postmaterialist

intergenerational value change thesis. First, Inglehart scholarship on growing
accumulative long-term trend of postmaterialist value change was primarily designed and
tested in the western developed hemisphere of the world. Although he revisited many of
the universal conceptions of modernization, yet it cannot be argued that it holds
comprehensively for other parts of the world as shown in earlier discussion. Hence, we
call for refining the index while accepting its principal causal mechanism.
Second, mean scores for Egyptian youth values and other MENA-states are below
the international average mean on the materialist/postmaterialist indices. Further this
trend is back-warding internationally and clearly in Egypt due to different factors.
Internationally, one can assume that the 2008 financial crisis caused much of this
decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values. However the overall international score on
postmaterialist values are far from the scores of Egyptian youth in post-2011 on the
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contrary to what have been theorized by many Middle East scholars of democracy. This
finding is crucial to account that international postmaterialist patterns do not hold for
Egyptian youth in the post-2011, in fact Egypt‟s scores have been decreasing steadily
since 2001. Therefore, I can say that structure of Egyptian youth values is different from
other international youths. It still emphasizes more on materialist priorities of survival,
existential security and traditional-cultural dominance according to Inglehart‟s measures.
Third, overall scores of MENA-Muslim countries are quiet low on both the
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression dimensions. This raises issues of
cultural singularity and persistence of cultural traditions in this underdeveloped part of
the world. While scores of Western Europe, North America and South East Asia are
relatively high, this further emphasizes my original criticism on the inadequacy of such
dimensions to be tested in MENA and Africa per se. Finally, both Inglehart‟s models
(bivariate dimension and postmaterialist indices) are not sensitive for testing Egyptian
youth value system. It can be owed to its Eurocentric routes, question wording, data
collection techniques and might be due to the unfulfilled prophecy of modernization per
se. The results above entails more investigation for the material values among Egyptian
youth that was statistically shown to be different from older generations, yet have not
been empirically considered before these lines are being written.
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CHAPTER III
YOUHT POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES
The widespread popular mobilization took place in Egypt during 2011 had
remarkable implications on the study of youth participation and role in the society.128
Moreover, it instigates problematizing this demographic phenomenon going beyond the
age as independent factor in explaining such unpredicted wave of activism. Younger age
cohorts -termed as political generation in much of this study-, who participated and in
part prepared for this unprecedented historic wave of mobilization, gauge much of the
potential of democratization in Egypt. Many scholars and commentators argued that they
differ in their features from older generations, thus affecting the direction of change in the
country‟s political settings.
This chapter deals with such claim on Egypt‟s current political generations; from
an individual-oriented perspective. As earlier chapter showed that Egypt‟s young
generation differs from international trends of postmaterialism, I aim in this chapter to
portray and anatomize youth value holdings. Moreover, I account for the fragmentation
effects with the current generation of young Egyptians, in another words, I do not treat
the youth as holistic one bloc. I start by examining youth political values using different
parameters such as interest in politics, political trust and efficacy to gauge the differences
among Egyptian cohorts testing the claim on youth‟s singularity and its relation to
mobilizing the 2011 uprising. Then, I examine their democratic values in terms of
support, authoritarian attitudes and degree of satisfaction with political system based on
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democratic literature that accounts for youth activism and their related role in successful
democratization. This chapter provides an unconventional understanding for the profiles
of young Egyptians that are believed to be diverse unlike the original assumptions by
many Middle East scholars.
3.1 Youth Political Values
The study of political generations in the Arab world since the 1970s regarded the
youth category to determine future pathways of respective Arab states. Tessler noted that
before on his studies on Algerian and Moroccan youth in early 2000s, in which they
differ from their older counterparts whose formative years were deeply entrenched with
the independence struggle in contrast to the post- independence periods of 1970s and the
1980s.129 Those who were brought up after1970s in the Arab world are thought to be
more expressionists and democratic in different way from their peers as well.130
I hold similar argument in Egypt, given the historic mobilization took place in
2011 and its implications on the Egyptian political system. However, I believe that post2011 settings showed lack of political organization and high fragmentation among the
young themselves. In the following sections, we tend to explore the generational
differences in respect to political orientations in Egypt during the 2000s. And the next
step is to anatomize such generational-split, to measure the degree of value consistency
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among youth. Table 3.1 shows list of political orientations‟ parameters used in
subsequent sections based on obtainability of available data sets.
Table 3.1 Political Values‟ Indicators

WVS 2000

WVS 2008

X

X

Interest in
Politics

AB 2011

WVS 2012

AB 2013

X

Political
Trust

X

Political
Efficacy

X

X

X= used items

Interest in Politics
Measuring political and behavioral attitudes is a deep-rooted tradition when it
comes to assessing youth‟s political involvement, participation, and the reasons for their
social exclusion in the northern hemisphere of the world.131 Generally, youth perceived to
be disinterested in politics and public affairs.132 Previous explanations owe such findings
to the shared belief of irrelevance of politics to youngsters. Moreover, youth see no direct
attachment for politics to their direct material interests. In addition, other studies focus on
the complexity of the political phenomenon to young people to comprehend. Moreover,
as part of their rebellious nature, young people showed steadily low level of confidence in
governments and politicians. On the other hand, much of the research that challenges
such deliberative alienated youth perceptions focuses mainly on their voluntary
philanthropy activities.133 Hence and in the same line, following the 2011 events in
131
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Egypt, studies on Egyptian youth involvement, accounted for the safe spaces “parallel
spheres” that Egyptian young men and women acted in to avoid authoritarian contexts.134
In which prior to the politicization of the Egyptian society as a post transitory effect,
youth vocally expressed their opinions through cyber space, social media platforms, and
organized themselves through non-profit organizations. Scholars believe that such lowpolitics engagements led to the historic mobilization of January 2011. In this section,
however we tend to discard the common perception that Egyptian youth are detached
from public affairs, and account for the cohort differences in regards to political interest.
Thus, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: over the past decade, younger Egyptians are more interested in
politics and public affairs.
In order to test such claim, I use a common repeated item through in the WVS
surveys that asks respondent to show his/her degree of interest in politics on a scale from
1 to 4.135 We reversed the item, thus more interest in politics tends to be at the positive
pole. Moreover, I use data from the WVS over a period of 11 years in Egypt comparing
generational differences and intra-generational cohort change as well. We use a bivariate
correlation matrix between the interest in politics variable and age categories, where age
cohorts where rounded by the CAPMAS weights mentioned above.
For better visualization, frequency distribution was converted into percentages as
shown in Table 3.2. It shows the levels of those who showed high or some interest in
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politics divided by age categories. Results show that total percentages of interest in
politics have fluctuating over the past decade in Egypt to reach its maximum after the
2011 events reaching 69.1% of total sample in 2012. Respondents of (16-30), showed the
lowest level of interest in politics in 2001; however their scores increased dramatically at
2012, when they became at the age of (31-40) to score 71.7% interest in public affairs.
Although Egyptian society has shown high level of politicization in general, and the
differences between cohorts are not blunt, yet those who are between 16 and 30 are
among the most politicized sections of the society with 68.2% at 2012. Life-cycle
theories argued before that interest in public affairs is a function of age, yet the high level
of youth politicization is remarkable and differs from other parts of the world. This
assures our initial assumption on the politicization of Egyptian youth during 2000s and in
the post-2011 epoch. It shows how the 2011 events politicized the whole society,
especially among youth who are most interested in the fate of politics in their country.
Table 3.2 Interest in Politics by Age Categories

2001

2008

2012

%
Interested
in Politics

%
Interested
in Politics

%
Interested
in Politics

16-30

38.1

34.9

68.2

31-40

39.7

27.7

71.7

41-50

45

31.3

73.3

51-60

42.8

60.8

66.9

61+

50.6

28.6

64.5

Total

41.2%

32.7%

69.1%

Source: WVS (2001-2008-2012)

The high level of interest in politics in the Egyptian society signals convoluted
messages for the sake of analysis, thus table 3.3 shows the generational value change in
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terms of politicization, it shows that Egypt‟s younger generation in 2012 are highly
interested in politics in relation to their older peers, while the youth of 2001 showed high
degree of change in their interest in politics over time by (-3.2+44=40.8%) reflecting a
higher propensity of intra-generational value change over the past decade in Egypt. One
important lesson to be drawn here regardless of the young interest in politics; is such
scores reflect a reaction to a certain stimuli and there is no guarantee that this will
continue to be the case in the near future.
Table 3.3 Change in Values of Political Interest

Age Categories
16-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61+

2001-2008
Value Change136

2008-2012
Value Change

-3.2
-12.5
-13.7
+18
-22

+33.3
+44
+42
+61
+35.9

Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001, 2008 and 2012)

Political Trust
Political trust as concept is different from trust in governing institutions; the latter
implies an evaluating perception of the performance of ruling institutions, while the
former entails confidence in policy outcomes. Political trust is a conviction that the
political system –as whole or part- would return ideal outputs, even in the case of it being
untended.137 This sentiment is one of the most important pillars of given regime‟s
political stability. Political trust reflects tangible attitudes rather than mere reactions
towards certain policies. Moreover, it provides a window for any given political system to
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maneuver if faced different hardships with the credit of trust portrayed by its citizens.
Following the literature on “political trust,” there are two main broad themes in explain
such sentiments.
One is the rational choice theory that views it from cost-benefit analysis of
political actors‟ choices.138 Although this perspective does not deny the role of values and
norms in shaping public‟s behavior, yet it does not regard it as sole controlling factor in
explaining political trust. Rational choice theories focus on governmental actions and
behavior, where the controlling independent factor is the ability of respective regimes for
providing good policies and the public perception of officials as good or bad people.139
On the other hand, cultural theories argue that short-term material calculations have little
explanatory power in predicting the outcomes of political trust. Although the public react
to different stimuli, however there is an interceding mechanism that ascribes meanings
and values for it.140 Thus, these interceding orientations make the actors react differently
to the same events based on number of stratifiers. On the other hand, culturalists do not
overlook institutional effects; however changes in value and norms are independent from
the former. Values affect people‟s behavior and have considerable explanatory power in
predicating political trust in a given society.141
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Projecting the earlier review on the Egyptian case; studies on political trust as part
of democratic culture has not been thoroughly tested in the Egyptian case as part of a
general trend of overlooking such implications in the developing world. Political trust is
expected to be higher in authoritarian contexts as a given government presents itself as
the state guardian, protector of peoples‟ needs and most importantly using sentiments of
nationalism especially in the developing world.142 Examples of the populist regimes are
various in the Arab world; Egypt under Nasser provides a clear example for such
sentiments and connotations. On the other hand, studies of civic and participatory culture
suggest some sort of political distrust, as a measure of keeping elected officials under the
public‟s power restraining them from power abuse and corruption.143
In this section, we argue that political trust is of importance to be tested in the
Egyptian case reflecting generational divide. Data in hand -that reflects post-2011
circumstances- is expected to show such divide and even more fragmentation among the
youth themselves. Much of the research done in the developed states, show that political
trust is a reaction towards governmental outputs rather than accumulated events.
Moreover, we expect the young to show more political distrust than their older
counterparts. Part of the explanation is that younger Egyptians who instigated the events
feel that the political system let them down and insensitive for their continuous hardships,
while the elderly who are affected by national sentiments of the post-independence
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regimes are expected to enjoy more trust regardless of the relative failures of the
Mubarak regime and its dissolution. This I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: younger generation is expected to show less political trust in
comparison to older cohorts
Hypothesis 2: Those who receive less income are expected to show less political
trust than those who receive more income per month in Egypt
In doing such task, we constructed Political Trust Index (PTI) from the Arab
Barometer data on Egypt at 2011. PTI serves as the main dependent variable in OLS
regression showing the effect of age and income on such parameter. It is constructed
through an additive scale ranging from -1.5 to1.5 constructed from 4 items as shown in
figure 3.1. Items included vary from supporting government decisions unconditionally,
government is aware of citizens‟ needs, political leaders care about public opinion, and
that government takes citizens‟ opinions into account.144 These items correlated on
reliability scale test at α= 0.753, where p-value< 0.01
Figure 3.1 Political Trust Index Items of the Arab Barometer 2011

Citizens must support the government‟s decisions even if they disagree with Reversed
them
Government employees are aware of citizens‟ needs

Reversed

Political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens

Reversed

The government takes the opinions of citizens seriously

Reversed

Note: Arab Barometer Wave II

Also I check for interaction between low income receiving individuals below 300
pounds a month and younger generation defined as those are less than 35 years old, and I
144
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expect to find highest level of political distrust among them. As for the independent
variables, we use age and income in continuous manners, while the latter is measured in
Egyptian pounds. Moreover, I use number of controls such as gender and place of
residency and education level ranging from illiterate to postgraduate degree, thus in the
models below, we insert independent variables and check for interactions while
accounting for the various controls.
Table 3.4 OLS Regression for Factors affecting PTI in Egypt at 2011

Age
Income

Model 1
0.024***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.000)

Model 2
0.021***
(0.006)

Model 3

0.000
(0.000)

Younger Generation
Young and Low Income
Education
Urban
Gender (=female)
Intercept
R2
N

0.027
(0.054)
0.082
(0.200)
0.031
(0.217)
9.413***
(0.391)
0.023
708

Model 4

0.037
(0.042)
0.055
(0.158)
0.202
(0.152)
9.684***
(0.322)
0.013
1159

-0.024
(0.052)
0.126
(0.202)
0.000
(0.219)
10.511***
(0.217)
0.007
708

0.700***
(0.207)
-0.852***
(0.312)
-0.021
(0.053)
0.150
(0.198)
0.082
(0.219)
10.346***
(0.265)
0.022
708

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave II

Results from the OLS regression above in table 3.4 shows that only age accounts
for political trust as expected, however, it is of low magnitude, where in model increase
in PTI is a function of an increase of 0.021 years. It means as well that levels of political
trust are low among all Egyptians in general. Other controls did not yield significant
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correlations. As for the interaction between those of who are below 35 years old and of
low income was statically insignificant. Thus, in this section, I can argue that overall
level of political trust is low and age provides little evidence on its salience. However, we
do not dismiss the effect of age in explaining low political trust.
Political Efficacy
Concept of political efficacy is of a major explanatory power in predicting
political behavior and participation mechanisms. Efficacy is the feeling that sociopolitical change is possible and that one can play a vital role in this evolutionary
process.145 Great deal of political efficacy implies empowered citizens, in which they feel
that they can influence outcomes and decisions of respective political systems. 146 It is
argued that those who are more confident in their ability to affect the political system are
likely to support democratic system. Since the 1950s, scholars such as David Easton, has
incorporated the concept of political efficacy into the studies of political support.147
Easton and others based political efficacy during the socialization process to be the
potential pillar for active participatory citizens in democratic systems.
One major pillar for political efficacy is the concept of “self-efficacy” where it is
defined as one‟s judgment of his/her competences to organize sequences of action to
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yield certain types of enactments.148 Thus, self-efficacy affects one‟s choices, efforts and
emotions related to the performance of a certain tasks. In his social cognitive theory,
Bandura argues that self-confident citizens have the belief that they can produce certain
effects through political actions.149 He also distances between collective and personal
efficacy, where the latter or as termed “internal efficacy” might be influenced by
adulthood experiences. Thus, early democratic experiences are expected to have everlasting effects on one‟s perception of his ability to influence and change his society in
post-adolescence periods.150
In the case of Egypt‟s younger generation under study here, we aim to explore
their political efficacy attitudes especially in the post-2011 epoch based on number of
stratifiers. Little empirical research has been done to clarify such convoluted concept,
whether young Egyptians are politically confident in their abilities or not. We expect to
find younger generation more confident than their older peers especially in the post-2011,
may be in another circumstances such assumption might be invalid. However, such
attitudes might reflect certain reactive responses rather than profound beliefs.
Hypothesis 1: younger Egyptians are more likely to be confident in their political
leverage abilities
Hence, we predict political efficacy attitudes by age to measure its correlation and
figure out the main drivers behind such confident attitudes among young Egyptians.
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Political efficacy as the main dependent variable is constructed from item in Arab
Barometer surveys on Egypt at 2011 and 2013, which indicates that politics is too
complicated for understanding.151 We convert the original scale of this item from (1 to 4)
to (-1.5 to +1.5) then multiply the later by -1, thus the final version indicates more
confident in one‟s abilities towards the positive pole. Age is the main predictor factor that
is used in continuous terms, and I run the regression for each wave among those who are
less than 35 years old as well. Moreover, we use number of controls including income,
education, gender and place of residency.
Table 3.5 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Political Efficacy in Egypt at 2011 and 2013

2011
Full Sample
Below 35
Model 1
Age
Income
Education
Urban
Gender (=female)
Intercept
R2
N

-0.003
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
0.012
(0.017)
0.100
(0.063)
-0.209***
(0.068)
2.054***
(0.124)
0.020
708

2013
Full Sample

Below 35

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

0.000
(0.000)
0.017
(0.020)
0.092
(0.077)
-0.170*
(0.087)
1.814***
(0.078)
0.015
439

0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
0.029*
(0.017)
0.058
(0.061)
-0.019
(0.065)
1.738***
(0.138)
0.006
759

0.000
(0.000)
0.045**
(0.020)
0.038
(0.074)
-0.076
(0.081)
1.744***
(0.093)
0.015
464

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Waves II and III

Table 3.5 shows regression results for factors affecting political efficacy attitudes
in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. Our assumption that such attitudes are influenced by
151

Question wording is appendix H
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age cannot be assessed as such correlation was very weak and insignificant. Among the
control variables, being female in 2011 decreases confidence in political abilities by
0.170 at 99% confidence level among the younger generation; and this is a general
remark in post-2011 that women were marginalized from politics with the rise of Islamist
parties as result of the political vacuum following the fall of Mubarak regime. Moreover,
education is robust in 2013 in explaining confidence attitudes and such effect I believe is
attributed to the effect of urbanism as well.
To sum up, political orientations‟ parameters showed little support for age in
explaining much of its variance. High level of politicization in the Egyptian society in the
post-2011 settings decreases gaps among age cohorts, where political interest escalation
is due to intra-cohort change. As for political trust age was a weak predicator in explain
distrust among youth although reported, and the profile of low-income young Egyptian
was statistically insignificant to be proven. On the other hand, high education and
masculinity only proved to be relevant to explain political efficacy attitudes among
Egyptian youth in between 2011 and 2013.
3.2 Democratic Values
Almond and Verba in their historic book “Civic Culture” argued that stable
democracies come to existence through the equilibrium between acts of democratic
institutions and public expectations.152 This influential school of thought has been always
dominant in the study of democratic attitudes and democratic stability in the developed
world. Consequently, many political scientists have proposed models for testing such
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enduring hypothesis.153 This assumption holds that democracy tend to stabilize, when
citizens‟ demand for democracy equates institutional supply of it. Scholars of political
culture holds that high level of support of democracy results in institutional breakthrough
and that such support is an integral ingredient for sustaining democracy.154
However, such model of democratic supply and demand receives little empirical
support when empirically tested in cross-national studies developed through the WVS
successive surveys.155 Moreover, the same trend is present when analyzing democratic
support in the Arab world, where high support for democracy did not result in
democratization or institutional change per se. Results from the AB I and II support such
earlier findings through the works of both Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal.156
In this section, I hold Lingling Qi and Doh Shin‟s assumption that democratic
demand is two-dimensional conception that comprises support and dissatisfaction with
democracy at the same time.157 In this view skepticism towards democratic political
system is not a threat for democracy in principle. On the contrary, it can be perceived as a
qualification for improving democratic practices per se. However, in Egypt where
democracy was never tested for enough time to consider dissatisfaction with it as a mean
of its modification, I believe that such indicator serve to provide a comprehensive picture
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of democratic attitudes among young Egyptians. Moreover, since demand for democracy
is procedural in MENA and in Egypt particularly, I detect the level of authoritarian
support as well.
Hence, in this section I start by analyzing levels of pro-authoritarian attitudes,
satisfaction with the political system and finally predict support for democracy based on
the earlier qualifications. As many scholars believed that the main derive for the 2011
uprising is youth‟s aspiration for freedom and democracy.
Pro-Authoritarian Support
To detect the generational differences regarding authoritarian support, I run
regression. In which, I use an additive scale of pro-authoritarian attitudes composing two
variables from AB data on 2011 and 2013 conducted in Egypt. This scale included
questions on the inadequacy of democracy to protect civil liberties, and having rulers in
power with no elections.158 Both items were associated on reliability check at α=0.529 at
2011 and α=0.538 at 2013, at p<0.05. Questions were suited by reversing the item on
rulers with no elections, to indicate higher level of support for authoritarian attitudes at
the positive pole. The reason for choosing these kinds of measures is availability across
the data sets for comparison reason. Moreover, I ran regressions on two steps, one for the
whole sample explained by age, and other for those who ages less than 35 years old,
controlling for other factors. Controls are standardized across waves that portray
demographic parameters such as age, income, education and place of residency.
Table 3.6 shows a little association between age and pro-authoritarian attitudes in
the Egyptian society, where it only explains 0.004 decrease in it at 90% confidence level
158
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in 2011 with no evidence in 2013, while being female is important right after the
revolution for holding progressive anti-authoritarian values among ordinary Egyptian and
the young generation as well. Moreover, being Urban and young has a considerable
impact on decreasing authoritarian attitudes by 0.167 at 90% confidence interval at 2011.
In 2013, and during the Islamist reign in Egypt, urbanism still plays a robust predictor for
less support for democracy and its effect increases in the case of youth by 0.206 at 90%
confidence level if compared to the status in 2011. Other, education qualifies to explain
much of less support for such attitudes among all Egyptians in 2013.
Table 3.6 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Authoritarian attitudes in Egypt at 2011-2013

Age
Income
Education
Urban
Gender (=female)
Intercept
R2
N

2011
Full Sample Below 35
Model 1
Model 2
-0.004*
(0.003)
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.013
0.011
(0.020)
(0.024)
-0.029
-0.167*
(0.074)
(0.094)
-0.324***
-0.244**
(0.081)
(0.105)
3.132***
2.909***
(0.145)
(0.095)
0.032
0.033
707
436

2013
Full Sample
Model 1
0.003
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.045*
(0.025)
-0.281***
(0.088)
0.056
(0.095)
3.469***
(0.198)
0.038
728

Below 35
Model 2

0.000
(0.000)
-0.043
(0.030)
-0.206*
(0.112)
-0.093
(0.124)
3.621***
(0.141)
0.034
447

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Waves II and III

Satisfaction with Political System
In this section, we aim to show variation among Egyptians by generations in
respect to their confidence and satisfaction in the regimes performance at 2011 and 2013
through an OLS regression. The two-items used in this scale deal with confidence of
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Egyptians in their government, armed forces at the times in which the AB survey was
conducted.159 The items correlated on the reliability scale at α=0.503 in 2011, p<0.01,
where the positive pole on the additive scale indicates more satisfaction with the political
system. The reason for choosing such items is their availability over waves, and because
both the military and government are considered to be direct cause for regime satisfaction
attitudes in respective literature. And we ruled out analysis for 2013, government at that
time represented an ideological government, and the army had its own independent
position from the ruling Islamists elite during the period in which the data was collected.
Moreover, I ran regressions on two steps, one for the whole sample explained by age, and
other for those who ages less than 35 years old, controlling for other factors. Controls are
standardized across waves that portray demographic parameters such as age, income,
education and place of residency.
Table 3.7 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Regime Satisfaction in Egypt at 2011

Full Sample
Model 1
Age
0.016***
(0.003)
Income
0.000
(0.000)
Education
0.006
(0.023)
Urban
-0.307***
(0.085)
Gender (=female)
-0.185**
(0.092)
Constant
6.589***
(0.167)
R2
0.067
N
709
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source AB Waves II
159
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Below 35
Model 2

0.000
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.025)
-0.233**
(0.099)
-0.127
(0.110)
7.398***
(0.099)
0.025
440

Results from table 3.7 for factors affecting regime satisfaction attitudes show that
age is positively correlated with high level of confidence in political system. Where it
explains increase in support by 0.016 in 2011, which is low indeed, yet it provides an
insight on the rule of thumb logic that as person ages, his satisfaction with the status quo
increases. Urbanism continue to be a decisive factor in the Egyptian case, where its
robustness in explain less degree of satisfaction with regime performance reaches 0.233
in explaining such attitudes among youth. Gender shows negative association in 2011
which matches the rule of thumb that women who face more structural hardships are
more likely to show less satisfaction with respective political system.
Democratic Support
In this section, I aim to test Lingling Qi and Doh Shin‟s argument on reasons
behind democratic support. Thus, I assume that lower levels of regime satisfaction and
authoritarian attitudes is direly related to the increase demand on democracy, and then
test such argument on Egyptian youth between in 2011.
Hypothesis 1: The less authoritarian attitudes, the higher democratic demand
Hypothesis 2: less levels of regime satisfaction is related to democratic demand
For regression, I constructed a democratic support additive scale from AB dataset
on Egypt at 2011, including questions on democratic performances in relation to
economy, marinating order, inclusivity and if it is the most preferred political system by
respondents.160 Items correlated at α=0.919 at 2011 p<0.1. Items were reversed, thus
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positive pole indicates more democratic support. I use similar set of demographic controls
used in earlier sections.
Table 3.8 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Democratic Support in Egypt in 2011

Age
Pro-Authoritarian
Regime Satisfaction
Income
Education
Urban
Gender (=female)
Intercept
R2
N

Full Sample
Model 1
-0.002
(0.007)
0.395***
(0.097)
-0.326***
(0.084)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.010
(0.052)
0.456**
(0.194)
-0.163
(0.214)
8.306***
(0.728)
0.060
653

Full Sample
Model 2
-0.002
(0.011)

Below 35
Model 3

Below 35
Model 4

0.420***
(0.122)

0.000
(0.000)
-0.037
(0.064)
0.460*
(0.242)
0.232
(0.273)
7.173***
(0.630)
0.012
415

0.000
(0.000)
-0.037
(0.060)
0.498**
(0.238)
0.368
(0.270)
5.811***
(0.432)
0.040
412

-0.202*
(0.117)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.062)
0.404
(0.247)
0.237
(0.279)
8.515***
(0.898)
0.020
404

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave II

Table 3.8 shows factors affecting popular democratic demand among Egyptian
youth in post-2011 epoch, results are informative given the high level of political
instability the country has pushed through reflected on values. Results show that
democratic support is not a function of age across all models. Surprisingly, proauthoritarian attitudes explain much of the support for democracy in full samples and
among the youth. Democratic support increases due to an increase of 0.42 in 2011 at 99%
confidence level. This striking finding stresses that democratic norms in Egypt still is
different from the western societies, moreover during the times in which the surveys was
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conducted both in June 2011, youth failed to organize themselves and allied with
conventional powers in the society which is by virtue non-democratic. In another vein,
regime satisfaction correlated negatively in 2011, which matches our original assumption.
Other urbanism continues to be a robust measure in explaining such attitudes.
Finally, I conclude this chapter by stating the findings aimed to be reached
through analyzing several political and democratic indicators of Egyptian younger
generation. Moreover, I believe this study is salient, as it presents for the first time
different insights on the degree of fragmentation with the holistic bloc “youth” treated by
many scholars and commentators. First, following the post-2011 events till the present
moment, there is a high degree of politicization of all segments of the Egyptian society.
Most importantly, from 2001 to 2008, may of the young generation have been under
process of political socialization increased their interest in public affairs, which in part
explains the 2011 uprising afterwards. However the post-uprising political attitudes are
wed mainly to intra-cohort changes rather than generational replacement.
Unlike the common logic that Egyptian youth feel more confident in their
political abilities, results showed that age does not explain much attitudes in post-2011,
however, higher levels of education and masculinity increaser the level of political
efficacy. On the other hand, political trust as expected which works mainly in
authoritarian contexts is negatively associated to attitudes shared by young Egyptians
particularly in early 2013, before toppling down the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) backed
government by the army during that summer.
Finally, democratic attitudes works among Egypt in dissimilar fashion like rest of
the world. However, it matches Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler‟s earlier work on the
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procedural democratic aspirations in the region. The main feature that determines
democratic demand among Egyptian youth is urbanism. I think it has to do with the
cosmopolitan nature of living in big cities and exposure to alien ideas other than the
traditional effects of conservative institutions in rural places. Moreover, support for
authoritarianism explains much for democratic support, and it matches earlier findings in
the region that democracy aspired in this part of the world is not liberal in the western
sense and reflects a polarized situation among youth between 2011.
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CHAPTER IV
YOUTH RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL VALUES
Social scientists such as Weber and Durkheim have argued since the late
nineteenth century that conventional religious attachments are fading as result of
modernization thus to be regarded the central thesis of social inquiry during that period of
time; however MENA region along other parts of the world raised skepticism over the
former thesis after the “Six-Days” war of 1967 and “Yom Kippur” war 1973.161 Much of
the writings stemmed from the Arab region regard the above mentioned events to be the
base line of religious revival in the Middle East after the successive secularization
attempts carried out by post-colonial regimes in the region such as Nasser in Egypt and
Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. Moreover, since levels of socioeconomic development
varied across the region and within societies, I believe that it did not yield such universal
trend of secularism as argued by modernization theorists before.
In another vein, literature on the propensity towards religiosity in the Middle East
is descriptive and anecdotal; it does not attempt to produce systematic generalizable
models of explanation. In addition, it does not focus on the individual-level as basic unit
of analysis to explain difference and variations particularly within generations.162
Moreover, less writings focus on the interplay between religious attitudes and events of
the Arab spring 2011. As Islam plays an important role in agitating and mobilization
protests as part of decreasing the costs given the developed sense of religious solidarity
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among protestors.163 Thus, the underlying assumption in this chapter that religion “Islam”
plays an important role in affecting people political and social attitudes in MENA and
particularly in Egypt and we expect to find a relationship between piety and political
activism in Egypt. Furthermore, drawing on our original thesis quest of generational
value replacement in Egypt, I aim to uncover such complicated thesis through assessing
the degree in which religion affects youth‟s political attitudes towards protesting, support
for religious movements and gender equality. As findings from earlier chapters that
demographic predictors is indeed in interplay with traditional influences and I believe
that Islam plays an important role in that sense.
4.1 Debating Religiosity
Despite the universality of the secularization thesis argued by many social
thinkers and modernization theorists since the beginning of the last century, the 1990s
sparked a continuing wave of criticism for the fade of religiosity thesis. Secularization
thesis depended heavily in its explanation on evidence from the developed western
hemisphere of the world, yet various anomalies within such part of the world mainly the
United States of America proved to be an attention-grabbing deviant case coupled revival
of religious spiritually in Europe and the rise of violent radical religious-based
movements in the Muslim World. New trends of right-wing voting in Europe and
sectarian politics in MENA further emphasize such skepticism over the decline of
religion thesis prophecy advocated during most of the past century. Several questions
were raised after the 9/11 attacks to explain the “Bin Laden” phenomenon who was
basically rich and well educated, still managed to lead one of the most radical violent
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religious-based movement worldwide. Socioeconomic factors failed to predict and
explain such rich-based fundamentalism trend in the Arab World which opens the door
for more cultural-based explanations tracing individual-level attitudes and the propensity
for religious attachments.
There are two competing paradigms in explaining religiosity and its revival in
literature; one is “bottom-up” theories suggesting that societies regardless of their type of
religious attachments will lose interest in religion given the change in existential security
status as consequence of socioeconomic development.165 On the other hand, “top-down”
explanations argue that demand for religion is cross-nationally constant at any given
point of time, what controls the level of religiosity is the supply from religious
institutions and leaders in which they maintain the spiritual attachments among
individuals.
Drawing on the earlier distinction, Weber –an advocate of the secularization
thesis- developed a thesis on the loss of faith in religions based on the mounting
rationality among humans given the scientific advancements that confound religion in
different aspects.166 This Eurocentric vision of the redoing role of churches and priests is
owed to the technological advancements such as the Darwinism evolution thesis that
challenges the biblical interpretations.167 Moreover, such view regards the mystical
explanations of religion is to lose its importance due to growing logical expansion of
biology, quantum physics and chemistry. However, Weberian thesis is hard to prove
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given empirical findings and it did not account for the undeveloped parts of the world in
which science is still at its least status. Another related explanation is the “FunctionalReligion” theory that regards religion not to be only sets of metaphysical beliefs and
norms; rather it is a scheme of activities that identifies one‟s identity and route in life
from cradle to grave.168 Durkheim who laid the seminal foundations of religious
functionalism see that religion primarily is aimed at maintaining social cohesion and
providing collective benefits in forms of endowment and church-related services.
However industrialized societies are marked by functional differentiation where
professions are devoted for providing social services, health care and security thus to
replace the conventional roles done by the churches. In his description, such development
is arguably to lead for the loss of purpose for religious attachments and support.
Such western explanations for religious attachments have been criticized
especially in the past couple of decades from theories stemming from the same rational
scheme of thought as well. Scholars such as Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge
argues in contrary to Durkheim that religious plurality among Christianity led to
fortifying religious attachments as the demand for religion is constant among human
beings.169 The theory of “Religious Markets” assumes that the more religious
denominations are in rivalry, the more likely for religious institutions to exert more effort
to keep their followers and effect. Such theory is valid according to its origin in the
developed world that is predominantly Christian marked by different denominations and
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history of church domination over the medieval ages, yet explaining religiosity in the
Muslim world and Middle East region –for me- is due to different set of reasons.
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart developed a secularization theory that is based
mainly on the level of existential security in given society, however it accounts also for
the persistence of cultural traditions in keeping religious faith in tact in different parts of
the world.170 Their first core assumption lies on security in which richer nations are
expected to be more secure in terms of economic as well as direct material one. This has
a direct effect on the existential security that affects one‟s cognitive abilities to think and
question societal norms, thus in richer nations secular-rational norms tend to be the most
dominant. The other underlying axiom that Norris and Inglehart‟s theory depends on is
cultural traditions; according to this view accumulative value change is path dependent
on contrary to viewing it as an iron law applied to all universal cases. The latter universal
view in debating religion in societies is yet having never been tested in the
underdeveloped world, although it accounts for it. In the next section, I analyze the role
of Islam in shaping values and the symptoms of religiosity in Egypt especially among the
youth and its expected implications on supporting religious movements, political activism
and gender equality.
4.2 Religious Revival in Egypt
During the 1960s, Egypt was on the track of modernism in the western sense that
included secularism highlighted with the confrontation between the state and religious
organizations mainly the MB and coupled with the nationalization of the Al-Azhar.
However the post-1967 war with Israel led to revisiting the Islamic influence in Egypt
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due to the loss of faith in secularism and the end of pan Arabism. Islamic revival was at
its peak in MENA and Egypt during much of the 1970s and 1980s.171 Coupled with the
state desire to confront leftist-Nasserists, students become Islamized in which some took
violent roots heightened by the assassination of Egypt‟s president Anwar Al-Sadat in
1981. Girls starting wearing veil in a contrasting feature to their mothers who did not
adopt such custom during much of the twentieth century.172 Features of Islamization
continued during much of the twentieth century as result of the petrodollar effect coming
from cultural remittances from the ultra-conservative Gulf States.
Egyptian state as mentioned above has utilized religion in different ways to keep
its influence and sustain legitimacy in the post-colonial ear. Egypt scored 62.92 with the
third rank in the Middle East on the index of government involvement in religion
(GIR).173 This index measures the degree of government involvement in religious affairs
based on a combined five factor scores of the official function of religion in a given state,
state‟s treatment for all religions, minority religious freedom, regulation of the
majoritarian religion, and the degree in which laws depends on religion. Moreover, one
cannot explain the religious revival without accounting for the transforming role of the
historic Egyptian main Islamic institution “Al-Azhar” and its clergy “Ulema.” Starting
from 1961, the nature of education at Al-Azhar has been qualitatively and quantitatively
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under severe change.174 First, introducing non-religious subjects led to changing the
cognitive perception of the Ulema to face the long-lasting controversy of science and
religion and the need to deal with such puzzle. Other through institutionalizing it to be a
public university –with the remarkable increase of student enrollment as showed in Table
4.1- led to delegitimizing its sacred nature that Al-Azhar‟s Ulema have always utilized to
keep their influence in the society.
Table 4.1 Expansion of Al-Azhar‟s Institutions and Student Body
Year
Number of Institutes
Number of Students
1962-63
212
64,390
1972-73
1,265
89,744
1982-83
1,273
302,044
1987-88
2,053
517,968
1992-93
3,161
966,629
Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the
State (1952-1994),” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, 1999, p. 379

Moreover, modernization of Al-Azhar opened a venue for its political role
welcomed by the state during much of the 1960s and 1970s. Such political activism was
intensified with the rise of fundamental Islamism during the 1970s till the moment of
assassination of Sheik Al-Dahabi in 1977.175 However since many other Islamist factions
challenged its legitimacy mainly the MB and fundamentalists, Al-Azhar Ulema became
more politically involved than ever during the 1970s; coupled with a divergence within
its clergy body itself. The presence of religious competition led to the creation of
peripheral Ulema apart from the official coopted ones, thus their political role diversified
in consequence as well. Some Al-Azhar clergy as well became radicalized and theorized
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for terrorism as Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman who is currently under life imprisonment in
the U.S.176
Another explanation for the rise of religiosity in Egypt among youth since the
1970s that continue till this day is the malfunctioning nature Arab States. Nazih Ayubi
argued that Arab states are alien structures created by foreign powers rather than national
bourgeoisies. Hence, these post-colonial structures are over-stated in sense of the
supremacy of the formal apparatus in relation to other non-state actors; this hinders the
role of intermediary institutions such as civil society in fostering democracy.177 Although
in Egypt, President Sadat in 1980 passed a constitutional amendment stating that Sharia
(Islamic Jurisprudence) is the main source of legislation as Islam is the official religion of
the state, to face the rising wave of Islamism in society. However, Egypt burdened with
huge defense public spending due to the successive wars with Israel abstained from its
nation-building tasks, and more importantly from building national consensus regarding
controversial foundations of the state.178 Public space in Egypt following Sadat‟s
“Manaber” plurality conception integrated only state‟s coopted/loyal elites allowing no
other venues for opposition expect the grassroots social service work. In this sense,
Islamists‟ role was growing especially with recruiting the young who were attracted to
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the charitable work coupled with “da‟wa” (preaching for Islam) in the absence of the
state‟s role in providing for social services.179
In this context, Islamist grassroots movements have been functioning with an
attractive platform offering an alternative for the restrictive Egyptian regime. Following
the toppling down of Mubarak in 2011, the main Islamist opposition movement (MB)
with their long history of providing social services in marginalized areas capitalized such
social activism to a political power and won both parliamentary and presidential elections
in 2011 and 2012. The logic behind such social activism is rooted in Islamist movements‟
doctrine, according to the teachings of Hassan Al-Banna –MB founder-

reforming

society is a lengthy process that has to start with preparing an Islamic individual, family
and then community.180 Such doctrine attract young men who get education, spiritual and
social training through practicing Islam in wider sense.
Combating the un-Islamic state of Egypt, various Islamist movements from MB to
Salafis or Sufis; focused on social work to gain support and recognition from ordinary
Egyptians and in particular the youth.181 Islamic charity filled the diminishing role of the
indebted Egyptian state that adopted the IMF structural adjustment plan. For instance, it
is estimated that 2,457 Islamic charity organizations were in function in Egypt at 2003.
This trend of charitable work is very important in underrating religious revival in Egypt if
taken comprehensively in a wider context of the rise of political Islam.182
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Egyptian youth have been suffering from identity crisis since the 1967 defeat and
the fade of Pan-Arabism. As such Islamism provided a solution for those who are
struggling to define themselves as Muslims in the light of the Egyptian-Israeli peace
agreement of 1978. Individual religiosity provided a compromise for young Egyptians
coupled with economic hardships due to the uneven socioeconomic distribution in the
society.183 The ICT advancements and social networking helped in fortifying such
sentiments as well; still it is a hard exercise to map youth Egyptian religious attachments
and whether it means a break from the religious establishments or it still attached
somehow to the pre-2011 Islamists movement‟s doctrine. Thus, my quest in the next
sections to map attitudes regarding supporting political Islam, participating in protests
based on Islamic justification and gender equality.
4.3 Religious Effects
As mentioned above this central section in this chapter aims at mapping outcomes
of youth religious attitudes in Egypt and its implications on supporting political Islam,
mobilization/ political activism. All these aspects are theoretically challenged on religious
basis, and my aim here to map such claims and test it in relation to the post-2011 settings
especially among the youth in Egypt.
Propensity to Support Political Islam
Concept of political Islam is a theoretically debatable one; as there is no
comprehensive definition for its underlying components. Historically political Islam is
related to the rise of Islamist movements and parties that advocate the rule of Islamic
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jurisprudence in their respective societies; a clear example for that is the Islamic
revolution regime in Iran in the post-1979 settings. One view to illuminate political Islam
is treating it as a set of ideas that explains all aspects of life including political
interactions, and societal rankings according to the laws of good “Shari‟a.” 184 Thus
supporters of political Islam have this universal belief that Islamic laws works for times
and societies according to the same sacred pattern. Other scholars define it procedurally
as set of actions that help political Islam supporters to provide a future imagination for a
perfect Islamic community through re-applying the basic traditions and principles of the
virtue ancestors.185
Another contending view is to define Islamist movements as the cradle of political
Islam we talk about in the sense of political activism. Identifying Islamist movements is
yet a hard task to be done, and the blurry lines between fundamentalists, traditionalists,
and Islamists are hard to draw. Even there is no clear definition for an Islamist, Muslim
and Islamic scholar, if ruling the political objective out. Thus, Bjørn Utvik argued that
there are three main key pillars for placing a movement into the Islamic category.186 One
is the adherence to the ultimate rule of Shari‟a; other is identifying themselves as
Islamists, and lastly the institutionalized nature of their work towards their goal.
According to this former practical definition, many movements qualify to be considered
as Islamist movement; however my quest in this section is more comprehensive to test
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the propensity for supporting goals of political Islam among young Egyptians in the
aftermath of the 2011 events.
There are many reasons portrayed in the literature for supporting Islamist
movements, one must theoretically differentiate between sympathy/support and actual
casting votes for Islamist parties competing in pluralistic elections, if any. However, my
aim here to focus on support for political Islam, and I develop a causal claim around piety
and socioeconomic conditions that push ordinary citizens to support –at least sympathizewith Islamist political movements. Orientalists in their scholarship of the Middle East,
have arguing that Islam provides a comprehensive instrument to explain and cope with
different societal and political conditions; anyone can counter throughout his lifetime.187
This develops my first casual examination here that those who are more pious tend to
support political Islam as their conception of the unity of Islam, politics and social order
intensifies such feelings and conviction. Moreover, I expect to see such relationship
among the pious youth as well.
Hypothesis 1: young pious Egyptians tend to support political Islam more than
non-pious youth.
Another rational for supporting political Islamist movements is the socioeconomic
situation that individual face in his life. With profound history in charity, Islamist
grassroots organizations in Egypt have been active over the last three decades in
providing educational, health and financial support for different Egyptian stakeholders.188
Thus, we expect to find a trend among those who suffer economically to be more
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supportive for Islamist movements based on the casual claim mentioned above, coupled
with it we add a control in the same sense that since the governments detained from
providing for social services, those who distrust government more are likely to support
political Islam.
Hypothesis 2: young poor Egyptians are more likely to support political Islam.
Hypothesis 3: The more level of government distrust among young Egyptians, the
more likely to support political Islam.
Finally, another reason for supporting political Islam is the demographic nature of
youngsters. This hypothesis goes in both directions; the first is that the young, urban and
well-educated with a certain degree of western exposure are less likely to support
political Islam as Inglehart‟s theory of generational value change and its implications in
industrialized societies towards secular-rational kind of values. On the other hand, Oliver
Roy argues that among the proponents of militant Islamist movements are those who
comprise the young elite in the society, where those who are well-educated facing harsh
conditions to get recognition in the Egyptian society.189 Thus, we believe that education
has dual effects.
Hypothesis 4a: young Educated Egyptians tend to support political Islam
Hypothesis 4b: young less-educated Egyptians tend to support political Islam
Moreover, in order to further test the relationship between education, income and
piety, I use set of interactions to control for the effect of piety on both income and
education and its outcome on supporting political Islam in Egypt among the youth.
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The analysis below aims at examining youth support for political Islam at two
different points of time after the Arab Spring events in Egypt at 2011 and 2013 based on
the data available from the Arab Barometer waves II and III. The dependent variable
used to measure propensity for political Islam is an additive scale variable of three
different survey items as shown in figure 4.1, where the positive pole indicates more
supportive attitudes towards political Islam.190
Figure 4.1 Arab Barometer Items to measure Support for Political Islam
Religious leaders should not interfere in voters‟ decisions in elections
.
Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.
Reversed
Religious leaders should have influence over government decisions.

Reversed

Note: AB Waves II and III (2011 and 2013)

The main independent variables used in this analysis are a continuous variable for
income measured in U.S dollars, and another for education categories, and a measure for
piety that uses number of times in which the person reads Qur‟an. 191 The reason for
choosing this variable is its reasonability in measuring piety according the investigators
of the Arab Barometer.192 And finally, a measure for government distrust that indicates
respondents‟‟ distrust in government after reversing the original parameter.193
For interactions, low income level denotes those who belong to the bottom 25%
income quintile in respective datasets or in other words their income is less than 300
Egyptian pounds in 2011 and 600 in 2013. As for education, we account for those who
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hold above post-secondary degrees. Thus I multiply low income and high educated cases
by our measure for piety.
I use different set of controls including age as continuous and as category for
those who are less than 35 years old, controlling for it on the sample level in our
regression as this study‟s purpose is to account for youth political values in principal.
Other, gender, place of residency, unemployment, and political interest are used.
Unemployment is an additional control to help in predicting economic hardships and its
effect on the outcome variable, while political interest, gives an overall view on the
degree of political exposure to other ideas to see if it would effect on supporting political
Islam.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below shows the OLS regression results for factors affecting
support for political Islam for Egyptian youth at both 2011 and 2013. It reflects high
degree of fragmentation in youth attitudes based on the political turbulences the country
has gone through in post-2011 epoch. As we find no explanatory power for age in
explaining such attitudes, I used a secondary step regression focusing only on the
younger generation or those below the age of 35 years old. Higher income levels related
really low in 2013 in explaining less support for political Islam.
As for interactions worked in our assumed propositions in 2011, yet it yielded
insignificant statistical correlations. In 2013, due to the high level of politicization of the
Egyptian society and divide among Islamists and secularists, such interactions worked in
souring way. By adding their coefficients, those who are pious and poor actually showed
less support for political Islam unlike our expectation by 1.14 at 99% confidence level;
this has to do with the perception of the MB in power and the decrease in their services
001

delivery. In a similar fashion, piety worked in different ways, while it explained 0.184
decrease in support for political Islam in 2011, it increased to explain 0.404 increase in
political Islam during March 2013. Again this is an obvious effect for the degree of
politicization and fragmentation among Egyptian youth prior to the 30th of June protests.
And the same goes for political interest which was robust measure across all models in
both waves, however started by predicting less support in 2011 to high support in 2013.
Thus, we can argue that high level of politicization and fragmentation among
Egyptian youth actually challenges existing narratives in the literature; we find evidence
for an interaction between low income and piety rather in showing less support for
political Islam in 2013 and the same for high education. However, piety in itself has
different effects in both cases. This we can assume that personal piety was a function of
political polarization when the MB ruled the country in mid-2012.
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Table 4.2 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Support for Political Islam in Egypt in 2011

Age
Income
Education

Full Sample
Model 1
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.041
(0.041)

Below 35
Model 2

Below 35
Model 3

-0.001**
(0.000)
0.062
(0.049)

-0.001*
(0.000)

Post-Secondary

0.036
(0.050)
0.467
(0.515)
-0.069
(0.145)

Post-Secondary and Pious
Poor

0.417
(0.634)
-0.103
(0.191)

Poor and Pious
Individual Piety
Gender(=female)
Urban
Unemployed
Interest in Politics
Government Distrust
Intercept
R2
N

Below 35
Model 4

-0.113
(0.079)
-0.021
(0.175)
-0.162
(0.146)
0.005
(0.086)
-0.456***

-0.184*
(0.102)
-0.001
(0.222)
-0.147
(0.185)
0.096
(0.106)
-0.546***

-0.035
(0.223)
-0.159
(0.184)
0.076
(0.105)
-0.569***

0.014
(0.228)
-0.215
(0.184)
0.085
(0.106)
-0.586***

(0.080)
0.037

(0.097)
-0.029

(0.096)
-0.009

(0.097)
0.004

(0.078)
7.883***
(0.431)
0.078
703

(0.106)
8.368***
(0.558)
0.109
438

(0.106)
7.877***
(0.469)
0.103
438

(0.106)
7.687***
(0.488)
0.095
438

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave II
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Table 4.3 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Support for Political Islam in Egypt in 2013

Age
Income
Education

Full Sample
Model 1
-0.008
(0.006)
-0.001*
(0.000)
-0.037
(0.040)

Below 35
Model 2

Below 35
Model 3

0.000
(0.000)
-0.107**
(0.045)

0.000
(0.000)

Post-Secondary

-0.106**
(0.044)
-1.417**
(0.613)
0.269
(0.135)

Post-Secondary and Pious
Poor

-4.511***
(1.118)
1.043***
(0.245)

Poor and Pious
Individual Piety
Gender (=female)
Urban
Unemployed
Political Interest
Government Distrust
Intercept
R2
N

Below 35
Model 4

0.377***
(0.074)
0.271*
(0.158)
-0.189
(0.135)
-0.020
(0.085)
0.187**
(0.075)
0.581***
(0.069)
3.181***
(0.440)
0.170
730

0.404***
(0.099)
0.296
(0.194)
0.054
(0.167)
-0.072
(0.098)
0.221**
(0.095)
0.549***
(0.083)
2.646***
(0.521)
0.165
452

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Source: AB Wave III
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0.288
(0.198)
-0.010
(0.169)
-0.015
(0.099)
0.208**
(0.097)
0.561***
(0.084)
4.213***
(0.328)
0.135
452

0.238
(0.196)
-0.005
(0.165)
-0.045
(0.097)
0.222**
(0.094)
0.593***
(0.082)
4.227***
(0.326)
0.168
452

Political Mobilization
In this section, I aim to examine the role of religiosity and its effect on political
mobilization among Egyptian youth, mainly participating in protests in the light of the
Arab Spring events. Youth are considered the main agitator of the 2011 uprising and its
subsequent protests calling for political liberalization and social equality throughout the
last four years. The reason for such assumption is that in many of the Arab Spring states,
Islamists took over power either through elections or through violent confrontation with
the ancient regime. However, many commentators and scholars portrayed the Arab
Spring at its commencement to be a non-Islamic spring calling for liberal values away
from the religious and sub-national authoritarian settings of the Arab world.194
On the other hand, other scholars such as Marc Lynch in his work on contentious
politics in Egypt suggested that mosques were a decisive factor in mobilizing Egyptians
especially the young to participate in the massive protests during January 2011.195
Furthermore, following the 2011 events, Fridays were the main day for protests in Egypt
till the present moment, and this adds to the role that Islam plays in agitating protest
feelings. Thus, our aim to examine the Islamic component in political mobilization
against the authoritarian regime among Egyptian youth, hence to be able to provide an
explanation for the casual mechanisms behind the 2011 uprising in Egypt away from the
direct socioeconomic causality.
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Taking our aim at the theoretical level, on the casual mechanism between
protesting as an outcome behavior and religion, several studies tackled such complicated
linkage. One aspect as Amaney Jamal describes it is the communal aspect of participating
in religious rituals, as it develops sense of homogeneity among religious denomination
members through developing a united sense of solidarity. 196 In the same sense,
participation in protests in authoritarian is physically and emotionally costly given the
force used by the incumbent regime, thus developing a religious spirit through communal
participation is explanatory to understand protest mechanism. In this view, individual
piety is less important than communal practices in explaining protesting behavior.197
Another set of explanations are developed at the individual level on the effect of
religion on protesting and political mobilization. One of them is the different aspects of
religious participation on political engagement, while religious activism activates
resources for collective action, while individual piety develops interest in politics, and
sense of political distrust.198 Michael Hoffman and Jamal identified several pathways in
which religion affect political mobilization.199 One is through building network of trust
among the members of same religion or members of the same religious community
through charitable services and continuous participation in religious rituals, which allow
more political engagement. Another mechanism is through the joint prayers as the case of
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“Friday” prayers in Islam that provides resources form collective action. And lastly, the
nature of religious teachings itself, as all religions have a utopian conception of society
that affects one‟s imagination of the society, thus open pathways for political
engagement.
Capitalizing on the discussion above and in order to examine the link between
religiosity and political involvement in Egypt among youth, I developed number of
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: the more pious young Egyptians are likely to be politically active
Hypothesis 2: attending religious communal practices increases the likelihood of
political activism among Egyptian youth
Hypothesis 3: the more the support of political Islam among Egyptian youth the
more politically active they are.
Building on that, the dependent variable measures political activism during the
post-2011 epoch. Items are shown in fgure 4.2 where added up together to form a
continuous variable since logistic regression.200
Figure 4.2 Items measuring Political Activism during Arab Spring in 2013
During the past three years, did you attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition?

During the past three years, did you participate in a protest, march or sit-in?
Note: AB Wave III (2013)

As for the central independent variables, I use the same variables of individual
piety and support for political Islam used in the previous section, in addition to a measure
for communal religious practice, asking individual if they attend Friday prayers on a scale
200

Questions wording is in appendix O
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order, the scale were reversed to indicate more communal practices towards the positive
pole.201 Other control variables does not differ that much from the last section to include
gender, education, income, unemployment and political interest, while age is inserted as
continuous then control for the younger generations in the OLS regression models.
Table 4.4 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Political Activism in Egypt in 2013
Full Sample
Below 35
Below 35
Below 35
Below 35
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
piety
-0.140***
-0.114**
-0.060
(0.043)
(0.057)
(0.050)
Political Islam

0.014
(0.019)

0.036
(0.024)

Communal Practice

0.089*
(0.046)

0.079
(0.056)

-0.039
(0.088)
0.088***

-0.099
(0.109)
0.105***

-0.093
(0.097)
0.101***

-0.152
(0.102)
0.106***

-0.063
(0.105)
0.102***

(0.020)
0.000

(0.024)
0.000

(0.023)
0.000

(0.024)
0.000

(0.023)
0.000

(0.000)
-0.066
(0.043)

(0.000)
-0.035
(0.051)

(0.000)
-0.040
(0.049)

(0.000)
-0.042
(0.051)

(0.000)
-0.053
(0.050)

0.119*
(0.070)

0.185**
(0.086)

0.186**
(0.082)

0.221***
(0.085)

0.209**
(0.083)

0.167***
(0.040)
-0.398*

0.093*
(0.050)
-0.452*

0.119**
(0.048)
-0.193*

0.099*
(0.051)
-0.516**

0.121**
(0.049)
-0.527**

(0.231)
0.140
724

(0.286)
0.141
450

(0.219)
0.137
476

(0.201)
0.139
454

(0.235)
0.142
474

Gender (=female)
Education
Income
Unemployed
Urban
Political Interest
Intercept
R2
N

Note: standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave III
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0.026
(0.024)
0.028
(0.050)

Results from table 4.6 suggest that our main independent variables including
political Islam do not explain much of the variation in regard to examining the relation
between religiosity and political activism for the youth in Egypt. Only individual piety
explains the outcome of political activism at its highest of (-0.114) at 95% confidence
level when it comes to those who are younger than 35, however it goes against our
original hypothesis that individual piety affects political activism in positive manner.
Moreover, communal practices scores relatively low at the full sample at (0.089) at 90%
confidence level with high standard error of 0.046, thus the precision of such explanation
is under question in explaining political activism during the Arab spring events in Egypt.
Other control variables as rules of thumb suggests explain much of the reasons to be
politically active in a robust way. Higher education levels increases the propensity for
youth political activism. Moreover, urbanism is another robust measure that explains
much of youth activism; with no other controls it explains 0.185 involvement at 95%
confidence level.
4.4 Youth and Gender Equality
Samuel Huntington along with other orientalists stressed on the incompatibility of
Islam with democracy and related values. His “Clash of Civilization” thesis mapped this
perception on Islam and its utility in regard to democracy and gender equality that is
invalid among Muslims.202 On the other hand, scholars from the Middle East stressed on
the tolerant nature of Islam, especially when it comes to protecting women rights. This
gave rise to the appearance of Islamist feminism line of thought; Heba Raouf argued that
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western orientalists tend to portray Islam an obstacle for gender tolerance, yet there is a
grey area adopting that Islam can be compatible with democracy and gender equality in
its heart.203 Within these competing paradigms this section evolves in its attempt to
explain gender equality attitudes among Egyptian youth based on religious explanatory
factors. Taking into consideration the modernization stances on the linkage between low
levels of socio-economic development and gender tolerance or democratic attitudes; this
section aims at assessing the religious factors that affect gender tolerance as a measure of
democratic support among Egyptian youth in post-2011 settings.
As mentioned above, the cultural school argues that Islam is not compatible with
granting women rights, as the values of Muslims and the west are totally different from
one another. In that sense, some scholars argue that Islamic teachings provide structural
hindrances for women rights and equality within Muslim communities.204 Moreover, as
Huntington argued other cultures than the western one denounces human individualism to
focus on the collective aspect of society, thus freedom in general is an inferior concept
including women in their respective society.205
On the other hand, Muslim scholars stressed that actually Islam emancipated
women historically from the Jahlia or ignorance before its arrival in the Arabian
Peninsula. Islam favored gender equality, for instance constraints on “polygamy,”
mentioned in Quran are hard to overcome when it comes to reality. And for women
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inheritance which is half to male siblings was very liberating at the time of revelation in
contrast to the Arabian pre-Islamic context.
In post-2011, many Egyptian women movements voiced out gender inequality,
and organized several campaigns against “sexual harassment,” such as “HarrasMap” and
“Women‟s Revolution in the Arab World.” Hence, my aim in this section is to test if
religion is linked to gender tolerance. Thus to assume that when public opinion support
for a certain cause; institutional breakthrough is likely to take place as result, as in the
cases of environmentalism in Northern Europe. Thus, I use two aspects of piety, as used
in earlier sections, one I related to the individual level of religiosity and the other is
related to supporting Islamist movements. We expect to find a negative relationship
between piety and the support for gender equality.
Hypothesis 1: More pious young Egyptians less supportive for gender tolerance.
Hypothesis 2: More support for Islamist movements means less support for
gender tolerance.
Another aspect that I want to test is the effect of western value system and its
effect on young Egyptian attitudes towards gender equality. Most of the political rhetoric
on promoting gender tolerance in the Muslim world and Egypt originated by western
governments; different western international donors condition their aid to Egypt based on
empowering women in society. Thus, those who see gender equality ideas as western
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form of neo-colonialism other than traditional military invasion are expected to be more
reluctant to accept ideas related to gender tolerance. 207
Hypothesis 3: the more anti-western feelings the less support for gender tolerance
In order to test such hypotheses, I use OLS regression to predict the religious
factors explaining gender tolerance at both 2011 and 2013. The dependent variable as
figure 4.3 shows is constructed on a scale based on additive scale from the Arab
Barometer survey at 2011 and 2013, where more support for gender equality is directed
towards the positive pole of the scale.208
Figure 4.3 Arab Barometer Items measuring Gender Equality in Egypt in 2011 and 2013

A married woman can work outside the home

Reversed

In general, men are better at political leadership than women
University education for males is more important than university education for females
Note: AB Wave II and III
As for central independent variables, I use the same variables used to measure
piety and support political Islam, while for anti-western feelings, I use an item that asks
respondent to show their opinion regarding violent acts against the U.S as result of their
interference in the Arab world.209 Other controls, do not differ that much from the earlier
sections to include gender, education, income, unemployment and political interest, while
age is inserted as continuous then control for the younger generations in the OLS
regression models.
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Table 4.5 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Gender Equality in Egypt in 2011

Age
Political Islam
Individual Piety
Anti-Americanism
Income
Education
Gender (=female)
Urban
Political Interest
Unemployed
Constant
R2
N

Full Sample
Model 1
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.053
(0.038)
0.167**
(0.079)
-0.293***
(0.072)
0.000
(0.000)
0.008
(0.042)
1.850***
(0.181)
0.066
(0.148)
0.241***
(0.083)
-0.025
(0.088)
6.533***
(0.513)
0.225
679

Below 35
Model 2

Below 35
Model 3

-0.038
(0.050)
0.071
(0.105)
-0.342***
(0.092)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.010
(0.051)
1.683***
(0.236)
0.240
(0.193)
0.326***
(0.105)
-0.056
(0.110)
6.468***
(0.645)
0.204
423

-0.041
(0.049)

Note: standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave II
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Below 35
Model 4

Below 35
Model 5

0.112
(0.103)

0.000
(0.000)
0.006
(0.050)
1.645***
(0.225)
0.272
(0.187)
0.267***
(0.101)
-0.011
(0.107)
5.873***
(0.486)
0.158
446

0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.050)
1.575***
(0.225)
0.224
(0.187)
0.304***
(0.098)
-0.052
(0.108)
5.200***
(0.394)
0.151
452

-0.334***
(0.092)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.014
(0.050)
1.686***
(0.235)
0.264
(0.190)
0.382***
(0.099)
-0.066
(0.110)
6.290***
(0.408)
0.199
425

Table 4.6 OLS Regression for Religious Factors affecting Gender Equality in Egypt in 2013

Age
Political Islam
Individual Piety
Anti-Americanism
Income
Education
Gender (=female)
Urban
Political Interest
Unemployed
Constant
R2
N

Full Sample
Model 1
0.013*
(0.007)
-0.081*
(0.044)
-0.129
(0.092)
0.034
(0.083)
0.000
(0.000)
0.039
(0.050)
0.848***
(0.196)
-0.127
(0.163)
0.096
(0.094)
-0.094
(0.107)
8.029***
(0.541)
0.043
634

Below 35
Model 2

Below 35
Model 3

-0.102*
(0.062)
-0.166
(0.131)
-0.029
(0.111)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.032
(0.061)
0.663**
(0.259)
-0.002
(0.216)
0.034
(0.127)
0.088
(0.131)
9.269***
(0.667)
0.039
381

-0.141***
(0.052)

Below 35
Model 4

Below 35
Model 5

-0.148
(0.118)

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.053)
0.581**
(0.229)
0.186
(0.190)
0.102
(0.112)
0.039
(0.114)
8.467***
(0.449)
0.036
460

0.000
(0.000)
0.009
(0.054)
0.534**
(0.232)
0.186
(0.195)
0.061
(0.113)
-0.025
(0.117)
8.326***
(0.521)
0.020
481

-0.082
(0.113)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.062)
0.611**
(0.265)
0.051
(0.220)
-0.042
(0.130)
-0.011
(0.134)
8.500***
(0.490)
0.020
396

Note: standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: AB Wave III

Results from tables 4.8 and 4.9 shows that religious factors works in different
ways among Egyptian youth at 2011 and 2013 due the polarization taking place in the
society in the post-2011 events; for instance piety explains supporting gender equality by
0.167 at 95% confidence level in 2011 in contrast to our original hypothesis, while it has
no effect in 2013. Anti-American sentiments explain less support for gender equality in
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2011. Anti-American sentiments are very robust especially among the youth, if no other
independent factor was added, while it provides no significance in 2013.
Support for political Islam is a robust measure to explain about 0.14 less support
for gender tolerance if no other independent factor is added in 2013 at 99% confidence
level. This has to do with the changing nature of the Egyptian political formula at the
time in which the survey was conducted. During the MB rule, they showed less support
for women empowerment in society and their share in shaping public policies. Other,
being female and showing political interest is robust factors across all models for the
whole sample and the younger generation to explain more support for gender equality at
99% confidence level in 2011 and in 2013, it robustly explains much of the support,
while age works in dissimilar way, as those who are old more supportive for gender
equality, when controlling for education and income in 2013. This provides a surprising
fact that being young does not mean necessarily adopting liberal values reflected in
gender equality.
To conclude this chapter, I state the main remarks we can draw from this chapter.
It provides an interplay on youth social, activism and religious values in the post-2011
epoch in Egypt. Earlier chapters prove that Egyptian youth fall behind international and
rather regional trends in terms of adopting values on the postmaterialist standardized
index. I hypothesized that religion plays a salient role in predicting such attitudes. Thus, I
draw some conclusions that I believe worth highlighting and open the door for future
research beyond the scope of this thesis. As presented, Egyptian youth with doubt can be
considered as one liberal bloc in the western sense. Youth in Egypt ere historically
involved in the waves of Islamic revival since the early 1980s and the rise of violent
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militant Islamic groups. Assassination of Egypt‟s late president Sadat is an example for
that. Exploring the propensity for young Egyptians to support Islamist movements in the
post-2011 settings, I find no evidences for deprivation motives, may be it can be related
to voting behavior that was not assessed in this study, where actually the interaction
between low income and piety yields less support for political Islam. It entails that there
is separation between Islam in the public and private spheres. However, Egyptian youth
who showed support for political Islam are divided based on the effect of higher
education levels even if they are pious and the same holds for distrusting governments,
which I think is chronic symptom of the post-independence Egyptian state. Other effects
were dismissed from analysis due to data availably such as the effect of transnational
petro-dollar from the Gulf States that I think explains much of the religious revivalism in
the Egyptian society.
Other, participating in the 2011 uprising and its subsequent waves of protest and
political activism among youth during the last four years is not explained by piety. In part
communal practices such as mosque attendance explain part of such mobilization, yet not
in a very coherent way. On the other hand, youth demographics determine much of such
activism which typically includes urbanism and interest in politics. Finally, age actually
works in an opposite direction in explain gender tolerance as one of the most liberal value
as argued by many scholars. Thus, youth show an overall level of traditionalism when it
comes to supporting gender equality. Moreover, young Egyptians who hold anti-western
feelings in 2011 and support the MB and related Islamist movements in 2013 show
higher degree for gender intolerance.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The aim of this concluding chapter is to present findings from previous sections
and chapters in relevance to the study‟s main quest of tracing generational value
differences in Egypt and its explanatory power in relation to the 2011 uprising. In doing
such task, I start by drawing features of youth fragmentation and then account for the role
of generational value change in relation to the Arab spring.
5.1 Fragmentation of Egyptian Youth
We started the analysis contesting the common assumption that youth in Egypt
cannot be rendered one holistic bloc, yet it encompasses different parts. Moreover, this
study challenged claims on youth features in MENA to be liberal and secular, thus those
who agitated the 2011 uprising were actually angry youth facing different structural
hardships as argued by several scholars such as John Esposito. This study aimed to
explore youth values in Egypt in relation to both its international and regional milieu as
well.
Given the salience of worldwide youth activism, and the rise of different protest
movements over the past decade, ranging from toppling down authoritarian regimes in
East Europe to the Arab spring to occupy movements in the western developed part of the
world; Inglehart since the 1970s argued that there is a sweeping generational value
change towards postmaterialist values of self-expression, quality of life and belonging
given the changing nature of societies, where economic security deceases much of the
constraints on human minds, thus opting for post-material sort of values. Hence, values
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of gender and sexual equality in addition to the rise of environmentalism were expected
to take place all over the world.
Assessing the current status of such values, I constructed a world values map from
2010 and 2014 to detect such growing trend based on Inglehart‟s earlier work started in
early 2000s. However, my analysis used a geographical categorization rather than
Inglehart‟s cultural zones units. Geographically, such values are present in the developed
northern hemisphere of the world. Following North America and Western Europe, South
East Asia provides support for such changing context of world values. However the
Middle East scores least on Inglehart‟s dimensions (Secularism and Self-Expression),
even below many Latin American and African states.
Egypt as part of the Middle East as showed in both world and regional maps falls
among the lowest scoring countries on dimensions of postmaterialism, although there is
some deviant cases like Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon. This part of the world still raises
Inglehart‟s concerns with persistence of cultural traits and its relative singularity.
Projecting such thesis on the Egyptian case, we find little support for such thesis. Other
than being one of the lowest scoring countries in the world and the region on preferring
such values, Egyptian emphasis on postmaterialist values are moving backward since
early 2000s. This in part has to do with economic stagnation the country is facing
following the 2011 uprising, but also shed the light on the uneven distribution of income
within the country even during economic growth by the mid-2000s. Such fining opens the
door for investigating long-term versus short-term effects of economic progression on
value change in developing states such as Egypt.
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Egyptian youth give more emphasis on postmaterialism in relation to older
cohorts, thus there some evidence on existing cohort differences, however their
international and regional peers particularly following the Arab spring reflects more solid
emphasis on such new values according to Inglehart‟s scholarship. High income and
education levels explain the propensity for such values among Egyptian youth. Other
evidences for cohort differences are found when analyzing basic political and social
attitudes such as political efficacy and gender tolerance, however much of these
emphases are due to intra-cohort changes, rather than generational replacement per se.
During the past four years in Egypt, attitudes are found fluctuating, thus it needs
more time and surveys to detect profound generational value differences employing
longitudinal analysis technique. I believe that although results show little support for
Inglehart‟s thesis, one cannot disregard its effects, as Egyptian youth proved through the
analysis to be fragmented based on different predictors, mainly demographic ones.
Results of postmaterialism regression showed that such values are function of high
education and income and masculinity.
Other, youth according to the study above are divided based on different social, political
and demographic factors. Urbanism is the prevalent factor that explains much of the
liberal attitudes in Egypt, where being urban means showing more support for democracy
and gender equality, and it means less support for political Islam and authoritarian
attitudes. Being a male explains support for democracy, with more confidence in one‟s
political leverage, and support for postmaterialist values, expect for the case for gender
equality that is mainly supported by females. Education plays an important role in giving
more emphasis among youth on postmaterialism and political activism during the past
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years following the 2011 uprising. Other religious values like piety explains propensity
among youth for political Islam in various ways over different waves in Egypt. However,
we draw a distinction between individual religiously and communal religious practices in
explaining political activism in Egypt during the post-2011 epoch, where the latter is
found to have more power in explaining political activism.

These findings further

support our doubt on the homogenous nature of Egyptian youth and their related liberal
nature as many of Middle East democracy scholars argued before. Hence, features of
post-2011 political polarization and organization might be explained by our earlier
mentioned findings on the fragmented nature of Egyptian youth.
5.2 Arab Spring and Value Change
This section aims to project the study‟s findings on Arab Spring events and
related value change. Scholars and commentators have been emphasizing the liberal and
tolerant nature of current Egyptian youth who led the popular mobilization against
Mubarak in 2011, resulting in his step down. Results actually cast doubt regarding the
progressive nature of current Egyptian youth. However, other findings provides an insight
on the illiberal and less secular nature of politically active Egyptians who may be have
been underestimated by foreign commentators when it comes to describe Egyptian youth.
Adding double-faced dimensions from factors affecting political activism and political
efficacy values, I can argue that the model for Egyptians who have been politically active
over the past years following the 2011 events are marked by urbanism, high education,
interested in politics and less piety. It actually matches many of the arguments of the
young generation portrayed in western circles, however their leverage in the society is
what we cast doubt for.
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Moreover, results from previous chapters with little evidence shows that young
Egyptians are more dissatisfied with their respective political regimes, with a low degree
of political trust. Thus, indicating a general trend of dissatisfaction with the status quo
and urge for political change, however, pious young Egyptians show more support for
political Islam which in turn means less support for democracy, and gender equality.
Moreover, young pious Egyptians showed higher levels of political interest and efficacy,
thus the scope of change towards liberal settings in post-2011 arrangements requires
additional investigation. This is related to the MB rule in Egypt for while the AB III
survey was being collected in early 2013.
Moreover, and most surprisingly pro-authoritarian attitudes explains much of the
support for democracy among Egyptian youth in post-2011 settings. It means that
democracy in the western conception in terms of rotation of power through elections is
not fully shared by young Egyptians . This takes back to Jamal, Tessler and Hoffman‟s
conception of illiberal democracy spread in MENA. Empirical evidence from the AB has
showed repeatedly that democracy for Arabs is procedural rather than normative per se.
Thus, I can argue that young Egyptians who were active through social media and
led protests on the eve of 25th of January reflects that type of liberal politically active
young people and show postmaterialist propensities as well as Juan Cole and Esposito
argued before. However those who took over the scene afterwards hold different set of
traditional values as Religion proved to explain much of the variance in relation to
democracy and gender equality. Different features of social and political conservatism
were there in post-2011 and arguably supported by Egyptian youth. One example is the
election of MB members both for parliament and presidency. However, this study did not
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account for the role of Islamist youth in particular in post-Tahrir arrangements. This
study is different, as it provides an empirical insight on youth changing values in the
Middle East and Egyptian society. It opens the door for democracy scholars to study this
historic bulge from a generational point of view rather than treating them as one bloc.
Moreover, it shows that conservatism is a growing trend in the region and it explains
much of the variance in regards to conservational issues and basic human rights and
freedom. Moreover, it allows for qualitative study on the profiles of different Egyptians,
thus treating the January 25th events in isolation from the January 28th supporters and
later forms of youth political associations. It takes democratic aspirations in the region to
ground, thus exploring other questions that might be actually center to the future of Egypt
and the Middle East, most importantly the question of political Islam.
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Appendix A
Traditional versus Secular-Rational Values
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)
1- How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 mean
“very important” and 1 means “not at all important.”
2- Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which,
if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five,
where 1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned
- Independence
- Determination and perseverance
- Religious faith
- Obedience
3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between: “Abortion” on a scale from
1-10. 10 means always justifiable
4- How proud are you to be (Nationality), on a scale from 1-4, 1 means very proud

5- I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take
place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether
you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (Greater
respect for authority) on scale from 1-3, where 3 is bad.

032

Appendix B
Survival versus Self-Expression Values
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)
1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index:
If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most
important? (Two choices; first and second)
- Maintaining order in the nation (M)
- Give people more say (PM)
- Fighting rising prices (M)
- Protecting freedom of speech (PM)
2- Taking all things together, would you say you are happy? Scale on 1-4, 1 means
very happy.
3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between: “Homosexuality” on a scale
from 1-10. 10 means always justifiable
4- Now I‟d like you to look at this card. I‟m going to read out some forms of
political action that people can take, and I‟d like you to tell me, for each one,
whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would
never under any circumstances do it “Signing Petition,” 1= did, 2= might do,
3=would never do
5- Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people? 1=most people can be trusted, 2=need to be very careful
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Appendix C
World Cultural Map at 2000
Source: Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge: University Press,
2005, p. 63.
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Appendix D
Table: Mean Scores of Countries on Dimensions of Cultural Variations Sorted by
Highest Loads on Survival/ Self-Expression Values
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)
Country

Survival /Self-Expression

Traditional /Secular-Rational

N

Sweden

2.0291

0.542

1022

Netherlands

1.6132

0.4113

1610

Australia

1.4983

-0.0694

1389

New Zealand

1.4093

-0.0021

459

Germany

1.0534

0.5435

1761

Japan

0.9758

0.926

1395

Slovenia

0.9472

0.6313

762

Spain

0.9058

0.3345

976

United States

0.833

-0.1699

2032

Uruguay

0.6676

0.0024

705

Singapore

0.5529

0.0896

1962

Estonia

0.3183

1.1317

1223

Chile

0.3014

0.0405

852

Taiwan

0.2869

0.952

1080

Mexico

0.271

-0.9201

1933

South Korea

0.2649

0.7647

1138

Belarus

0.1911

0.5854

1300

China

0.1707

0.9127

1452

Uzbekistan

0.1505

-0.8609

1334

Poland

0.1256

-0.0567

786

Cyprus

-0.0076

0.0677

915

Philippines

-0.0314

-0.5622

1177

Colombia

-0.0366

-0.9486

1442

Peru

-0.0777

-0.3507

1039

Qatar

-0.1254

-1.2734

1046

Russia

-0.1436

0.7208

1751

Lebanon

-0.1869

0.3061

1059

Ecuador

-0.2278

-0.815

1192

Kazakhstan

-0.234

0.2967

1494

Trinidad &Tobago

-0.2546

-0.9264

927
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Country

Survival /Self-Expression

Traditional /Secular-Rational

N

Rwanda

-0.334

-0.3677

1521

Ukraine

-0.3458

0.8502

1336

Kyrgyzstan

-0.3657

0.1132

1414

Algeria

-0.3751

-0.0918

899

Turkey

-0.3936

-0.2496

1415

Malaysia

-0.4092

-0.2122

1282

Romania

-0.4231

0.2291

1289

Pakistan

-0.4504

-0.3016

1174

Nigeria

-0.4715

-0.3892

1758

Zimbabwe

-0.5386

-0.3928

1493

Libya

-0.5968

-0.5777

1790

Armenia

-0.6101

0.0197

927

Azerbaijan

-0.6525

0.0884

1000

Palestine

-0.681

-0.0655

899

Ghana

-0.6962

-0.7684

1550

Iraq

-0.7304

0.038

1070

Yemen

-0.7543

-0.254

609

Morocco

-0.8698

-0.0581

915

Tunisia

-0.8824

0.0326

1028

Jordan

-0.915

-0.3479

1162
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Appendix E
Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Value Index
World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, 6 (2001- 2008- 2012)
1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index
2- People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next
ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would
give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider
the most important? (Two choices; first and second):
- A high level of economic growth (M)
- A strong defense forces (M)
- People have more say about how things (M)
- Trying to make our cities more beautiful (PM)
3- Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Two
choices; first and second) :
- A stable economy (M)
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (PM)
- Ideas count more than money (PM)
- The fight against crime (M)
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Appendix F
Table: Mean Scores of (16-30) age category by Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Index
during 2010 and 2014 by Country Sorted by Highest Loads on Mean Column
Source: World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)
Country

Mean

Sample Size

Sweden

2.81

213

Germany

2.76

175

Slovenia

2.71

157

Chile

2.68

244

Spain

2.47

244

Uruguay

2.45

229

South Korea

2.43

231

Philippines

2.42

235

Colombia

2.39

326

Japan

2.32

105

Poland

2.32

212

Mexico

2.3

416

Netherlands

2.3

92

Romania

2.21

226

Singapore

2.21

254

Turkey

2.18

296

New Zealand

2.17

92

Ecuador

2.14

364

United States

2.14

221

Estonia

2.11

237

Australia

2.1

229

Peru

2.1

344

Lebanon

2.08

339

Zimbabwe

2.08

453

Algeria

2.07

349

Nigeria

2.01

600

Taiwan

2

236

Qatar

1.98

326

Malaysia

1.96

296

Belarus

1.95

249
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Country

Mean

N

Cyprus

1.93

332

Azerbaijan

1.9

335

Ukraine

1.88

252

Palestine

1.78

401

Trinidad and Tobago

1.78

249

Libya

1.77

445

Morocco

1.73

352

Iraq

1.68

375

Kyrgyzstan

1.68

341

Russian Federation

1.68

249

Ghana

1.64

581

Uzbekistan

1.59

270

Kazakhstan

1.55

348

Rwanda

1.55

466

China

1.51

234

Armenia

1.5

217

Jordan

1.41

313

Yemen

1.16

427

Egypt

1.08

396

Tunisia

1.07

403
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Appendix G
Interest in Politics
World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, and 6
(2001, 2008, and 2012)
1234-

How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one
answer):
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Not very interested
Not at all interested

Appendix H
Political Trust Index (PTI)
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011
123412341234-

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Citizens
must support the government‟s decisions even if they disagree with them”?
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Government employees
are aware of citizens‟ needs
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Political leaders are
concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
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1234-

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? the government takes the
opinions of citizens seriously
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
Appendix I
Political Efficacy
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011

1234-

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Sometimes, politics are
so complicated that I cannot understand what is happening
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
Appendix J
Pro-Authoritarian Attitudes
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011

-

1234-

1234-

I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your
opinion of each one of them with regard to the country‟s governance – for each
one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A democratic political
system (ensures public freedoms, equality in political and civil rights, devolution
of authority, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority)
Very Good
Good
Bad
Very Bad
I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your
opinion of each one of them with regard to the country‟s governance – for each
one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A political system with
an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to parliament and
elections (Reversed)
Very Good
Good
Bad
Very Bad
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Appendix K
Satisfaction with Political System
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011
12341234-

I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what
extent you trust each of them: the Armed Forces-Reversed
I trust it to a great extent
I trust it to a medium extent
I trust it to a limited extent
I absolutely do not trust it
I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what
extent you trust each of them: The government (the cabinet)-Reversed
I trust it to a great extent
I trust it to a medium extent
I trust it to a limited extent
I absolutely do not trust it

Appendix L
Pro-Democratic Orientations
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013
12341234-

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Under a
democratic system, the country‟s economic performance is weak (Reversed)
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems (Reversed)
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
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1234-

1234-

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability (Reversed)
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A
democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

Appendix M
Support for Political Islam
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013
-

12341234-

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Religious
leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should not interfere in voters‟ decisions in
elections
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Your
country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state -Reversed
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
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-

1234-

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Religious
leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government
decisions-Reversed
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

Appendix N
Piety Measure
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013
1234-

Do you “Listen to or read the Quran”? -Reversed
Always
Most of the time
Sometimes
Rarely

Appendix O
Government Distrust
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013
1234-

I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what
extent you trust each of them: The government-Reversed
I trust it to a great extent
I trust it to a medium extent
I trust it to a limited extent
I absolutely do not trust it
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Appendix P
Arab Spring Political Activism
Arab Barometer Waves III: Egypt 2013
-

Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past three
years, did you attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition? (Reversed)
1- Once
2- More than once
3- I have never participated
-

Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past three
years, did you participate in a protest, march or sit-in? (Reversed)
1- Once
2- More than once
3- I have never participated

Appendix Q
Islamic Communal Practice
Arab Barometer Waves III: Egypt 2013
1234-

Do you “Attend Friday prayer”? -Reversed
Always
Most of the time
Sometimes
Rarely
Appendix R
Gender Equality
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013

-

1234-

I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each
statement: “A married woman can work outside the home” –Reversed
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

045

-

1234-

-

1234-

I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each
statement: “In general, men are better at political leadership than women”
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each
statement: “University education for males is more important than university
education for females”
I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree
Appendix S
Anti-western feelings
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The United States‟ interference in the
region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere.” (Reversed)

1234-

I strongly agree
I agree
I disagree
I strongly disagree

046

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart, “Value Trends in Western Europe and the United
States,” Value Change in Global Perspective, Michigan, the University of Michigan
Press, 1998, pp. 9-23.
Al- Banna, Hasan, Five Tracts of Hasan al- Banna, Charles Wendell (translator), Near
Eastern Studies, vol. 20, 1978, pp. 13-39.
Al-Suwaidi, Jamal, “Arab and Western conceptions of democracy: Evidence from a UAE
opinion survey,” In Democracy, war, and peace in the Middle East, D. Garnham and
Mark Tessler (editors), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995, pp.83-85.
Albrecht, Holger and Oliver Schlumberger, „Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without
Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review, Vol.
25, No. 4, 2004, pp. 371-372.
Almond, Gabriel and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963.
Amin, Samir, L'Egypte Nasserienne, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1964, pp. 75-84.
Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, A Tahrir Studies Edition, Bahgat Korany and
Rabab El-Mahdi (editors), Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press, 2012, pp.
10-273.
Arab Youth: Social Mobilization in Times of Risk, Samir Khalaf and Roseanne Saad Khalaf
(editors), London, Saqi Books, 2011, pp. 57-82.
Awwad, Hani, “Religiously among the Youth: a Phenomenon Independent from the
Ideological Establishment,” Research Paper Series, Arab Center for Research and
Policy Studies (Doha Institute), November 2011, pp. 17-19.
Ayubi, Nazih N. Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East,
London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, p. 12.
Bandura, A. Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory, Englewood
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 483.
__________. “Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning, Educational
Psychologist, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1993, pp. 117-148.

047

Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York, Basic Books, 1973, pp. 146150.
Bellin, Eva, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004, pp.
139-141.
Berman, Sheri, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics,Vol. 1,
No. 2, June, 2003, pp. 257-258.
Bishara, Azmi, A Contribution to the Critique of Civil Society, Ramallah, Muwatin, 1997, p.
241-242 (Arabic)
Bratton, M. and R. Mattes, “Support for democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental?,”
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2002, pp. 447-459.
Brown, Nathan J, Michele Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt‟s Controversial Constitutional
Amendments,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2007,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf,
Retrived April 30, 2015.
Bruce, Steve, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 29-34.
__________, Religion and Modernization, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 168-180.
Campbell, A, G. Gurin and W. Miller, the Voter Decides, Illinois: Row, Peterson and
Company, 1954, p. 187.
Captain, Sean, “Infographic: Who Is Occupy Wall Street,” FastCompany.Com, November 2,
2011.http://web.archive.org/web/20120719184547/http://www.fastcompany.com:80/
1792056/occupy-wall-street-demographics-infographic, Retrived October 21, 2014.
Carpini, Michael Delli, Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and
Research, Robert S. Sigel (editor), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1989,
pp. 16-20.
Citrin, Jack, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American
Political Science Review, Vol. 68, 1974, pp. 978-979.
Clawson, Patrick, “Egypt's Industrialization: A Critique of Dependency,” MERIP Reports,
No. 72 1978, pp. 17-18.
Cole, Juan, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is changing the Middle East,
New York, Simon and Schuster, 2014, pp. 2-15.

048

Danigelis, Nicholas, Melissa Hardy and Stephen J. Cutler, "Population Aging, Intracohort
Aging, and Sociopolitical Attitudes," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 5,
October, 2007, pp. 812-825.
Davidson, Charles, “Reform and Repression in Mubarak‟s Egypt,” The Fletcher Forum of
World Affairs, Vol. 24, Fall 200, pp. 77-79.
Demartini, Joseph R. "Change Agents and Generational Relationships: A Re-evaluation of
Mannheim's Problem of Generations," Special Forces, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 4-12.
DiMaggio, Paul, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, pp.
270-280.
__________, “Culture and Economy,” In Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (editors.),
The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994,
pp. 27–57.
Dobbelaere, Karel, “Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Process related to the
Descriptive Concept of Secularization,” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp.
235-238.
Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labor in Society, New York, The Free Press, 1997.
Easton, David and J. Dennis, “The Child‟s Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 25-68.
__________, and Robert D. Hess, "A Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 6, August 1962, p. 236.
El-Taraboulsi, Sherine “Spaces of Citizenship: Youth Civic Engagement and Pathways to the
January 25 Revolution,” Youth Activism and Public Space in Egypt, Cairo, John D.
Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, the American University in
Cairo, 2011, pp. 10-13.
Farah, Nadia, Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development, Cairo, The
American University in Cairo Press, 2009.
Fattah, Hassan, “Egyptian Ferry Carrying 1,400 Sinks in Red Sea,” New York Times,
February 3, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/middleeast/03cnd-ship.html?_r=0,
Retrived May 10, 2014.
Fausat, Kimberly and Rebecca Bach, “Mass Education, Islamic Revival, and the Population
Problem in Egypt,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1991, pp.
329-330.

049

Fenno, Richard, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Boston, Little Brown, 1978,
pp. 240-41.
Furnham, A. and B Gunter, “Young people‟s political knowledge,” Educational Studies,
Vol. 13, No. 1, 1987, pp. 91–104
Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East, Navtej
Dhillon and Tarik Yousef (editors), Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution,
2009, pp. 1-10.
Greenstein, Freed, "The Political Socialization," The International Encyclopedia of the Social
Science, New York, Macmillan, 1968, Vol. 14, pp. 551-555.
Harris, Frederick “Something Within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political
Activism." Journal of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 1, 1994, 63-65.
Hedges, Chris, “A Cry of Islamic Fury, Taped in Brooklyn for Cairo,” The New York Times,
January 7, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/07/world/a-cry-of-islamic-furytaped-in-brooklyn-for-cairo.html, Retrived May 26, 2015.
Hewidy, Fahmy “Neo-Egyptians,” Aljazeera Website, January 5, 2010.
http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/10e96716-7fee-452c-9491-bc715381150f.
Retrived October 27, 2014.
Hoffman, Michael and Amaney Jamal, “Religion in the Arab Spring: Between Two
Competing Narratives,” The Journal of Politics, 2014, Vol. 76, pp. 598-600.
___________, and Amaney Jamal, “The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and
Similarities,” Middle East Law and Governance, Vol.4, 2012, pp. 169-172.
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations,‟‟ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, pp. 2240.
Ronald Inglehart, “Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change,”
International Social Science Journal, No. 145, 1995, pp. 379- 384.
___________, Culture Ship in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1990.
___________, "Postmaterialism in an Environment of Insecurity,” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 75, 1981, pp. 883 -884.
___________, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political Science Review,
Vol. 82, 1988, No. 4, pp.103-110.
____________ , “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in PostIndustrial Societies,” American Political Science Review, No. 65, pp. 990-993.
051

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy:
The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge: University Press, 2005, 2-32.
__________, and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We
Know About Modernization,” Foreign Affairs, March/April Issue, 2009,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64821/ronald-inglehart-and-christianwelzel/how-development-leads-to-democracy, Retrived October 28, 2014.
Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Policy, Vol.
34, No.2, 2003, pp. 71-74.
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker , "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the
Persistence of Traditional Values, "American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1,
February 2000, pp. 21-50.
Inkeles, Alex and David Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Changes in Six Developing
Societies, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974.
Jackman, Robert and Ross Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture," American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 40, 1996.
Jamal, Amaney, “The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans Mosque
Involvement and Group Consciousness," American Politics Research, Vol. 33, No. 4,
2005, pp. 542-543.
Jennings, M. Kent "Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest
Generation," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, June, 1987, pp.
367-372.
__________, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations," The Public Opinion
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1996, pp. 228-252.
Khajehpour, Bijan, “Iran‟s Youth Key to Elections,” Almonitor, May 31, 2013,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/iran-elections-youth-vote.html#,
Retrived October 21, 2014.
Knickmeyer, Ellen “The Arab World‟s Youth Army,” Foreign Policy, 27 January 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/27/the-arab-worlds-youth-army-2/, Retrived June
01, 2015.
Larson, E. and L. Witham, “Leading Scientists still reject God,” Nature, Vol. 394, 1998, pp.
320-3222.
The Middle East, Ellen Lust (editor), 13th Edition, New Heaven, Yale University Press,
2013, pp. 220-236.

050

Lerner, Daniel, Passing Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York, Free
Press, 1958.
Lewis, Bernard, What Went Wrong?, New York, Perennial, 2003, pp. 1-2.
Lincove, J. “Growth, Girls‟ Education, and Female Labor: A Longitudinal Analysis,” The
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008, pp. 56-57.
Lynch, Marc, the Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, New
York, Public Affairs, 2012, pp. 91-92.
Mahgoub, Nahla and Reham Morsi, “Youth Perspectives on Citizenship and Civic
Engagement in Egypt," The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 3, 2014.
Mannheim, Karl, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti (editor), Essays on the
sociology of Knowledge, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 281-310.
Marx, Karl, “The German Ideology.” In The Mm-Engels Reader, Robert C. Tucker (editor),
second edition, New York, W.W. Norton, 1978, pp. 155-175.
Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality, New York, Harper, 1954, p. 236.
Mattson, James, “Development in the Arab World” in Mark Tessler (editor), A New Look at
the Middle East, Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1971, p. 13.
Mayer, William G. "Political Generations and Shifts in Public Opinion," The Public
Perspective, Vol. 7, 1992, pp. 10-12.
Moghadam, Valentine M. “Globalization and Women in the Middle East, Middle Eastern
Women on the Move, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2003, pp.
75-78.
Morrell, M. E. “Survey and experimental evidence for a reliable and valid measure of
internal political efficacy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 67, 2003, pp. 593-596.
Murphy, Emma, “Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure,”
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 7-9.
Nesvaderani, Tara, “Iran‟s Youth: The Protests Are Not Over,” United Sates Institute of
Peace, Peace Brief 36, June 8, 2010,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pb36_0.pdf, Retrived October 21,
2014.
Newman, Samuel, “Constructing Political Culture Theory: The Political Science of Ronald
Inglehart,” Politics & Policy, Volume 30, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 599-609.

052

Niemi, R, S. Craig, and F. Mattei, “Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national
election study,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991, pp. 14071410.
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide,
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 7- 24.
Osman, Tarek, “The Fall of Hosni Mubarak,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=233,
Retrived May 20, 2015.
O‟Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South
American Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.
Paige, Jeffrey, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," American Sociological Review,
Vol. 36, 1971, p. 976.
Parsons, Talcott and Edward Shils, Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 59-60.
Patterson, S, J. Wahlke and G. Boynton, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems" in
Alan Kornberg (editor), Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York,
McKay,1970, p. 273.
Putnam, Robert, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New
York, Simon and Schuster, 2000, pp. 73-75.
Pye, Lucian, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. vii-viii.
Qi, Lingling and Doh Chull Shin, “How mass political attitudes affect democratization:
Exploring the facilitating role critical democrats play in the process?,” International
Political Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2011), pp. 247-250.
Raouf, Heba, “Islam and Feminism: Towards a Democratic Overlapping Consensus,”
Contestations, Issue 1, http://www.contestations.net/issues/issue-1/the-first-issueresponse-1/, Retrived June 2, 2015.
Richardson, A. Talking About Commitment, The Views of Young People on Citizenship and
Volunteering, London, Social and Community Planning Research, 1990
Rizzo, H, A. Abdel-Latif, and K. Meyer, “The Relationship between Gender Equality and
Democracy: A Comparison of Arab Versus Non-Arab Muslim Societies,” Sociology,
Vol. 41, No. 6, 2007, pp. 1163-1165.
Rokeach, Milton, The Nature of Human Values, New York, Free Press, 1973, pp. 7-8.

053

Ross, Michael L. “Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the Resource Curse,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-08-19/will-oil-drown-arabspring, Retrived May 2, 2015.
Roy, Oliver, the Failure of Political Islam, London, I.B. Tauris, 1994.
Ryder, Norman, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," American
Sociological Review, 30, 1965, pp. 849-852.
Sadowski, Yahya, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate," Middle East Report,
July-August, 1993, p. 16.
Schuman, Howard, and Amy D. Corning, "Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The
Soviet Era from the Great Purge to Glasnost," American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
105, No. 4, January 2000, pp. 933-946.
Scott, James C. Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite,
Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 35-48.
Sears, David O. "Life-Stage Effects on Attitude Change, especially among the Elderly," in
Sara B. Kiesler, James N. Morgan, and Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer (editors),
Aging: Social Change, New York, Academic Press, 1981, pp. 185-200.
Shenker, Jack et al, “Young Arabs Who Can‟t Wait to Throw off Shackles of Tradition,” The
Guardian, February 14, 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/14/young-arabs-throw-off-shacklestradition, Retrived June 15, 2015.
Shorbagy, Manar, The Egyptian Movement for Change- Kefaya: Redefining Politics in
Egypt, Public Culture, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 175-196.
Sigel, Roberta, Learning About Politics: A Reader in Political Socialisation, New York,
Random House, 1970.
Slater, Joanna, “Historic ousting of Erdogan‟s majority spells new uncertainty for Turkey”,
The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/historic-oustingof-erdogans-majority-spells-new-uncertainty-for-turkey/article24846329/, Retrived
June 15, 2015.
Sorcher, Sara, “Arab Youth Still Want Change, But Won‟t Be Politicians,” National Journal,
August 4, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/arab-youth-stillwant-change-but-won-t-be-politicians-20110804, Retrived June 15, 2015.

054

Stark, Rodney and William Bainbridge, “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the
Secularization of Europe,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1985, pp.
233-239.
Tessler, Mark and Jodi Nachtwey, “Islam and Attitudes toward International Conflict:
Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World,” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 5, 1998, pp. 621-623.
__________, “Morocco's Next Political Generation,” The Journal of North African Studies,
Vol.5, No .l, 2000, pp. 8-12.
__________, Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political
Orientations of Ordinary Citizens. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011, pp.
75-124.
The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, Fawaz Gerges (editor), first
edition, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 161-165.
The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt, Solidarity Center, 2010, pp. 16-17,
www.solidaritycenter.org%2Fwpcontent%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F02%2Fpubs_egyp
t_wr1.pdf, Retrived May 2, 2015.
Theodoropoulou, Kastrinou, “A Different Struggle for Syria: Becoming Young in the Middle
East,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 60-61.
Utvik, Bjørn, “Islamism: Digesting modernity the Islamic way,” Forum for Development
Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 198-201.
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, Routledge, 1993.
Wellerstein, Immanuel, “Modernization: Requiescat in Pace,” in The Uses of Controversy in
Sociology, L. A. Coser and O. N. Larsen (editors), New York, Free Press, pp. 130132.
Welzel, Christian and H. Klingemann, “Evidencing and explaining democratic congruence:
the perspective of substantive democracy, World Values Research, Vol. 1, No. 3,
2008, pp. 57-59.
Welzel, Christian and Ronald Inglehart, “Agency, Values, and Well-Being: A Human
Development Model,” Social Indicators Research, Vol. 97, No. 1, May 2010, pp. 4850.
__________, Focal Point Human Development: On the Foundations of Democracy and the
Causes of its Spread (German), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002, p. 46.

055

Zeghal, Malika, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and
the State (1952-1994),” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, 1999,
p. 371-384.
Zohry, Ayman, “Rural to Urban Labor Migration: A Study of Upper Egyptian Laborers in
Cairo, Unpublished Dphil thesis, University of Sussex, 2002, pp. 29-31.

056

